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Darlene had been able to reach her by phone for several days, and since her car was in its 
usual place and had not been moved, they had become concerned for her health and safety 
Kevin explained that he was just checking to see that she was all right. At no time did 
Kevin say he thought Santana was out of town. 
13. Kevin and Darlene have no knowledge of this call as Pat Middleton did not tell them about 
any claim that Santana was feeling "stalked". 
14i~"It"is a fuftheTyiolationjof Santana's lease agreement to change the top lock on her front _ 
HjooTTAt thetime, Darlene and Kevin felt it was too minor a thing to pester Santana about ^  
because she wa&jisqaJly home to allow access to her apartment in case of an emergency. ^ 
|j It is seriousjyjJQuhtfii^thjir Santana lost a minute, of sleep over the incident since after 
^KeaFTng Kevin's explanation she thanked Kevin for his concern. 
15. Kevin Green was in Missouri during this transaction, jantana wiasjggsjegtin the Green's 
apartment whcjLKcvin/s_cx>wifc Tina asked if she could send Darlene a fax. Darlene told 
"Tina that she did not have a fax machine. Santana was aware of the personal nature of the 
fax and offered Darlene the use of her fax number. Santana had to provide Darlene with 
the fax number in order for the fax to be received at her apartment. Without that 
cooperation the fax could not have been received at Santana's apartment 
16. Santana reported to Darlene that she had not read the faxed letter once it was received as 
it was none of her concern. If Santana had read it as she claims she would know the letter 
makes no mention of the reason Kevin was in prison. Kevin and Darlene still have the fax 
which was received at S ant ana's apartment, dated April 2, 1997, which will show the 
extent to which Santana is willing to lie and slander others to cover her own actions. 
17. The contents of the letter are a personal matter between Kevin and Darlene Green. 1) The 
method of delivery had never beenofany consequence|to them 2) Santana lies when she 
claims the letter implies Kevin's guflt in AfcLYI crime. 
18. Santana did not live in fear of Kevin Green after the letter was faxed to her apartment. On 
more than one occasion following the arrival of the lettervSantafm-tflvrtecOCcyin intb~her 
__^^meat4Q^6ojrmT^erimc^mitk^^ to attempt to justify her reasons for complaining 
about her neighbors. Kevin and Santana were alone in Santana's apartment each time, and 
each time Kevin left Santana's apartment, Santana thanked Kevin for his help. 
19. Information given to Santana by her client Pat Middleton was on the one hand an effort by 
our daughter to hurt us because she mistakenly believes we had money to bail her out of 
the blackmail her attorney was putting to her, and on the other hand it was information 
kept confidential by Santana as Lawyer/Client privileged information. Neither Pat 
Middleton or Santana know the true details of any contact Darlene has had with public 
assistance agencies. Darlene was deemed to be 54% disabled by the court in California 
following a work related injury at K-Mart. The current personal injury suit stems from an 
automobile accident where Darlene was rear ended in Salt Lake City. Darlene never 
received a "large settlement" from the K-Mart injury, and Darlene is not expecting a "large 
-if* 
settlement" as a result of the ongoing personal injury suit Darlene never offered to pay 
Pat Middleton's legal expenses for two reasons, J) Darlene was never told there were 
going to be any legal fees, and 2) Darlene did not have, or expect to have any money to 
use for such a thing. 
20. Santana is now disclosing this "confidential information" gained from her client Pat 
Middlcton in order to justify her not paying her rent. Darlene has good days and bad days, 
and there are days when the work just has to be done. Santana fails to mention that Kevin 
does the vast majority of work Santana claims to have seen Darlene do once or twice 
21. Darlene and Kevin have had no interest in entering Santana's apartment without invitation 
or appointment. The June 19th notice was issued as a courtesy to all tenants. The 
inspections are part of the lease agreement and are necessary to prevent small problems 
from becoming large problems. Darlene and Kevin knew they could not enter Santana's 
apartment without her being there because it was no secret that Santana had changed the 
top lock on her front door. 
22. At no time did Santana avoid Darlene or Kevin Green. We seriously doubt that Santana 
gave a second thought to our interest in her client files. During the month of June 1997, 
there was at least one court date for Pat Middleton's custody case and at least one 
meeting in our home to prepare for the court date. 
23. Santana told Pat and Darlene that she needed the copies of the pleadings quickly because 
they had to be delivered by 5pm that day. Darlene and Pat rushed to get the copying done 
as Darlene had to have Pat home in Heber City also by 5pm. Upon returning with the 
copies they found Santana had left. Pat and Darlene could not wait for Santanajoreturn 
and in an-cJ9fbrXlo^cuij^e^opieswhere Santana_cjQuJo^geLlQJhem Darlene attempted^ 
to put them in Santana's apartment. Darlene had forgotten that Santana had changed the 
top lock, and once she realized she could not put the copies inside, Darlene had no choice 
but to leave them outside the door. 
24 The paperwork Santana was asked to sign was the routine addendum's to the lease 
agreement which were missing from her file. Santana had signed these forms once, and 
while filing a maintenance form relating to a plugged toilet, it was discovered that the 
papers were missing. No threat of a law suit was ever mentioned. Santana was simply 
asked to sign the papers so her file would be complete. We apologized to her because we 
thought at the time that we had somehow lost the paperwork. No threat of eviction was 
ever mentioned. 
25. When Santana returned the paperwork she made no mention of having any reservations 
about signing the papers. The papers were briefly checked to sec that they had been 
signed, but no notice was made that she had put JUD next to her signature. 
26. Michael Shields' identity was never kept a secret. In fact he had personally done work on 
the grounds and spoken with tenants. He has other business interests and asked not to be 
involved in the minor day to day events at Parksidc. Mike's personal phone number was 
^ 
v 
not given out because Mike did not have time to be receiving calls from tenants about 
leaky faucets and such. The letter Santana sent to Mike Shields contained no information 
as to the subject matter Santana wanted to discuss, so Mike ignored it. 
27. After the court hearing Santana asked Darlene and Pat to come to her apartment. 
Santana's rent was already seven (7) days late without explanation and Darlene suspected 
Santana was going to now start asking Pat for money. Santana did exactly that and 
threatened to quit the custody case if Pat did not pay her. No mention was made during 
this meeting of any obligation Santana now claims Darlene had already made to her. Pat 
Middleton and Darlene both told Santana that they each had no money. Pat began to 
become frantic again and Darlene told her she would try and find a way to get some 
money to lend her. Darlene did not and has never claimed to Pat or Santana, or anyone 
else, that she has the ability to "take care o f someone's rent. 
28. Darlene and Kevin Green were able to borrow money from a former son-in-law. The 
money was used by Darlene to take our daughter, Tina Robertson and her children back to 
their home in Texas, and S300.00 was lent to Pat and her husband Dave Middleton. On 
July 16, 1997, Kevin informed Santana that he and Darlene would have $300.00 to lend to 
Pat, and that this was all they could come up with. Kevin asked Santana when she would 
be able to come up with the remaining $215.00 of her rent. Santana stated that she would 
not be able to raise the money for her rent. On July 18,1997 j£evmxut-C4itlhejnid<ile 
^jrian and ripp^**^ the_S300,0Q in Santana's name? Kevin did it this way because it didn't 
make sense to drive to Heber City from Salt Lake, hand the $300.00 to Pat and Dave 
Middleton, then give them a ride back to Salt Lake City so they could hand the money to 
Santana just to have her hand it back to Kevin. Kevin prepared a receipt for $300.00 
thinking Santana would need this to verify that Pat had paid her this amount. Kevin also 
filled out a "3 day Pay or Vacate'* so Santana would know she was responsible for coming 
up with the remaining $215.00 for her rent Because Kevin believed they were all still on 
friendly terms at this time, he included a note with the receipt and 3 day notice suggesting 
that Santana ask for an advance from a client that Kevin knew Santana had just taken on. 
29. Pat Middleton called and left a message telling Kevin she would be down the following 
day with $215.00 for Santana's rent. Pat did not mention anything about evicting her 
attorney.( We have the complete answering machine tape containing Pat Middleton's one 
_juid only message on this matter \ 
30. July 19,20,21 and 22,1997, Kevin did ngU«tf4ten eimCT^atw^amaqa^ 
no mad rush to evict Santana and at this point the thought had not even con 
come up with her rent. At no time on July 21, 1997, did Pat Middleton or Santana 
attempt to pay the $215.00 owed on Santana's rent. On July 23, 1997, Kevin attended the 
child custody hearing in order to be supportive of his daughter during a trying time. The 
issue of Santana's rent did not come up until after the hearing was done. Pat and Kevin 
were one their way back to Parkside Apartments and Pat told Kevin that her husband 
Dave was getting paid that day and she hoped his check was not "messed up again" as 
they were planning to use Dave's check to pay Santana's remaining rent. Kevin even 
^ 
offered to drive to Heber City to pick the money up if need be. Neither Pat, Dave or 
Santana came by to pay the rent. Dariene and Kevin both attempted to call Pat on July 24, 
25, 26 and 27, 1997, but Pat and Dave had their phone turned off. On July 28, 1997, 
Mike Shields asked Kevin if Santana bad paid her rent. Kevin told Mike "No" and that he 
bad not heard from Santana about the rent up to that point The decision was then made 
to serve on Santana. That evening Pat called Kevin and explained that she had just 
received a check for $215.00 from her Bishop made out to Santana^ Kevin told Pat that it 
was too late, that Mike had decided that twenty-eifiht (28) days waTrnore consideration 
thanlhey could stand inhgh^oTAefapt *h*t rtthgr r»nt.pay»^jtenant^Jiad-fT«w«i^uf3i3g-— 
to Santana's constant complaints. 
31. On August 3.1997. Santana left a letter in the maintenance mailbox addressed to Dariene. 
v The letter can onjy be described is an attempt to slander and blackmail Dariene and Kevin 
into preventing the probable eviction proceedings against Santana The information 
contained in the letter could have only been provided by Pat and Dave Middleton. When 
Dave came to Dariene and Kevin's door, Dariene handed Dave a copy of Santana's 
blackmail letter, told him to thank our daughter Pat and closed the door. 
32. The eviction notice is just and proper. 
33. N/A 
34. Santana's knowledge of, or suspected knowledge of Kevin and Dariene's personal 
business is of no consequence in the decisionjo evict Santana. 
35. Eviction proceedings were begun long before there was any knowledge of Pat providing 
information confidentially to her attorney about her mother, and before Santana began 
using this information to attempt to blackmail Kevin, Dariene and Mike Shields into 
stopping the eviction proceedings. 
36. Santana's residency status at Parkside Apartments had nothing to do with Pat Middleton's 
child custody case These are two separate and unrelated issues. The timing of Pat's 
court appearances and the filing to evict Santana was never considered as relevant to one 
another. 
37. Dariene and Kevin had in fact attempted to prevent Santana's eviction by borrowing 
$300.00 to lend to Pat Middleton for her to pay her attorney. That was all we could do 
and we did it for our daughter. 
38. At no time did Dariene claim to Santana or to Pat Middleton that she had paid Santana's 
rent. 
39. Santana was given more than an ample opportunity to pay her rent. The responsibility 
was hers alone and she failed to abide by her lease agreement. 
40. Dariene and Kevin Green's conduct in this matter was more than fair. Santana was given 
a "3 day Pay or Vacate" on July 3, 1997, then again on Jury 18, 1997, warning Santana 
<;+ 
that her obligation to her lease agreement was her responsibility. An additional ten (10) 
days passed with no effort on Santana's part to pay her rent. Ten (10) more days passed 
before eviction proceedings began Santana's rent was due July 1, 1997, and she received 
thirty-eight (38) days of warning to either pay her rent or prepare to move. Tiiis is not 
"outrageous conduct". 
/ 
I 
\ 
43 
44. 
Santana did not pay her rent and had caused other rent-paying tenants to move out. This 
e only cause for eviction. 
Rent was not tendered by Pat Middleton on behalf of Santana. Pat had no money until 
receiving a check from her Bishop on July 28, 1997, a full ten (10) days after the last "3 
day Pay or Vacate". Kevin Green did not refuse to accept money intended for Santana*s 
rent until July 28, 1997 " 
There is no illegal PublicHousing scheme afPafkside ApartmentS-__ 
The remaining $215.00 of Santana* s rent was not offered until the evening of July 28; 
1997. This was ten (10) after the last "3 day Pay or Vacate" was given to Santana 
v*rpmr*rt>-ncL-f>ffnrfe nn anyone's part to evict Santana without just cause^ 
Santana is the person in these proceedings who has acted intentionally, maliciously, in 
wanton and reckless disregard for the rights of Kevin and Darlene Green, as evidenced by 
the two (2) slanderous blackmail letters she wrote; one to Darlene and one to Mike 
Shields. 
48. The only economic loss, mental anguish and emotional distress suffered by Santana to this 
point was caused by Santana entering into a conspiracy with Pat Middleton to defraud 
Kevin and Darlene Green and Mike Shields. This is evidences by the illegal "Tee 
Agreement" signed by Pat Middleton and dated February 17,1997. 
N/A 
Darlene Green did not verbally or otherwise agree to pay any portion of Santana's rent. 
Darlene told her-daaghtcr Parlvfiddlcton that she would help Pat when and where she 
could. Dartene honored that promjs^nany times by making long distance phone calls, 
paying for copteyof legal bri^srdelivering said briefs to the appropriate locations all over 
Salt Lake City, and by driving Pat to and from Heber City time and again for court 
appearances and meetings with her attorney Santana. 
51. Neither Darlene or Kevin Green ever paid Santana $150.00 in cash as Santana claims. On 
two separate occasions Pat and Dave Middleton requested a loan of SI 50.00 from Kevin 
and Darlene Green. Pat and Dave told us these loans were to help them make their car 
payment and to help them with their other bills. At no time did either Pat or Dave 
Middleton mention that they had to pay Santana for legal fees. Darlene and Kevin Green 
u'1 
were told from the beginning that Santana was working on Pat's custody case "pro bono" 
The 5300.00 in July again was a loan to Pat and Dave Middleton, and was applied to 
Santana's rent because we knew at this time Santana had forced Pat and Dave to agree to 
pay her rent or she would quit the custody case. 
52 Mike Shields had no knowledge of Darlene and Kevin Green lending any money to their 
daughter. 
53. Santana signed a lease agreement that makes her responsible for paying her rent The only 
other person who has agreed to pay Santana's rent is Pat Middleton. 
54. N/A 
55. Darlene did not verbally or otherwise agree to pay Santana's rent 
56. Darlene did not verbally or otherwise agree to pay Santana's rent. 
57. There was no direct or implied agreement for Darlene to pay Santana's rent so Santana 
was not damaged by Darlene. 
58. N/A 
59 Kevin Green attempted to enter Santana's apartment only after knocking and ringing the 
doorbell several times; and getting no response had a reasonable belief that Santana may 
have been in distress and unable to answer the door or telephone. Darlene Green 
attempted to secure important legal briefs in Santana's apartment and was unable to do so. 
The maintenance man, Leroy Copeland, forgot he could not use the pass key to enter 
apartment #36, but attempted to do so during apartment inspections. Leroy did go back 
and complete the inspection once Santana returned home and explained to Santana that he 
had unlocked the bottom lock that day 
60. On April 21, 1997, Kevin Green did not enter Santana's apartment at all. 
61. At no time did Kevin or Darlene Green intrude on Santana's privacy. Contact with 
Santana in her apartment was always by phone or by knocking at her door. 
62. See #46 
63. See #47 
64. See #48 
65. N/A 
66. All contact with Santana was attempted during daylight hours at a reasonable time to 
expect she would be available for contact. Again, Santana volunteered her fax number to 
Darlene fully understanding the nature of the fax prior to it being sent. 
^ 
67. The fact that Kevin Green had been in prison was never hidden from any tenant at 
Parkside Apartments. The fact that Kevin Green was found 'Tactually Innocent of all 
charges and allegations'' was also not hidden. During the custody case for Pat Middleton, 
Kevin provided Santana with copies of the findings of "factual innocence". Santana has 
no question of Kevin's innocence. Santana is lying when she claims that the letter faxed to 
her apartment even mentioned the reason Kevin was in prison, let alone casts doubt on his 
innocence. We have the letter faxed to Santana, dated April 2, 1997. 
68. The 'foregoing acts" did not occur. 
69. See #46 
70. See #47 
71. See#48 
72. N/A 
73. Not relevant to Santana's eviction and in fact not true. 
74. Not relevant to Santana's eviction and in fact not true. 
75. Managers are hired so owners can conduct their business without having to deal with 
petty every day problems. Santana had several other avenues to lodge complaints, if she 
ever had any, which she never used. She could have contacted the Housing Association 
or the B.B.8. if she really believed there was a problem the owner was accountable for. 
76. No dishonest dealing with or violations of Counterclaim Plaintiffs rights ever occurred. 
77. See #48 
78. N/A. 
\ 79 Eviction proceedings were undertaken because Santana did not pay her rent even after 
Vreceiving a twenty-eight (28) days grace period, and because Santana had caused rent-paying tenants to move out. 
80. At no time has any of these proceedings been intended to disrupt Santana's law practice or 
had anything to do with Santana's relationship with Pat Middleton. 
81. Santana was notified that it is a violation of her lease agreement to run a business of any 
kind from her apartment. Santana had informed Darlene that she had moved her practice 
to a proper office and was not conducting business from her apartment any longer. 
82. See #46 
83. See #47 
, ^ 1 
84. See #48 
85. N/A 
86. Kevin Green never "entered" Santana's apartment as she slept. Kevin unlocked the 
bottom lock after ringing the doorbell and knocking several times with no response. 
Kevin feared for Santana's safety and attempted to gain entry only to find out if Santana 
was all right. 
87. There was never an unreasonable risk in allowing a proven innocent man to have an 
emergency pass key to apartments. 
88. Santana never lodged a complaint of any kind claiming she was even a little worried about 
\ Kevin's presence. Santana's personal knowledge of the faa of Kevin's innocence makes 
these present claims unbelievable and slanderous. 
^l9Tsee#46 
90. See #47 
91. See #48 
DATED this^x/ day of August, 1997. 
fk™ &J-k& 
Kevin L. Green 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWARN TO before me this gj/ day of August. 1997. 
'•JP C*£ 
NOTARY REPUBLIC 
LINDA 1JONBS 
NOTAWKJEUCSrATBOTMlSSOUU 
ST.LOOBCX>UhrrY 
tyfYCOMMBBDN EXP. FEB. I^oon 
Owner's Name: Michael V. Shields 
Address: 2588 S. 900 E. #21 SLC, UT 84107 COMPLA3NTTOE 
Telephone: 466-8996 EVICTION'- ^ 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH l - — ° ^1 S u l 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. MURRAY DEPARTMENT /x : 
5022 S. State Street, Murray, UT 84107 • - ;xy :. r • y. 
) 
) 
Michael V. Shields ) COMPLAINT FOR 
Plaintiff (OWNER), ) EVICTION 
) (Unlawful Detainer; 
) Default in Rent) 
vs. ) 
) 
) Case No, 
Maria Santana ) 
Defendant (RENTER) ) 
) 
THE OWNER states the following complaint against the RENTER: 
QlM*>sar71 
1. The Plaintiff is the Owner of the premises at 2588 S. 900 E. #36 SLC UT 84106 
The premises were rented to the Renter under the lease or rental agreement The 
Renter agreed to pay rent in the sum of $ 515 Per month, beginning on the date of. 
August 1.1996 . A security deposit of $ 500 was also paid to the Owner. A copy of the 
Rental Agreement is attached as Exhibit "A". 
2. The Renter has failed to pay rent in the amount of $ 215 For the period of 
Julvl Through July 31 
3. A "3-day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate" was served on the Renter on the date of 
July 18. 1997 A copy of that notice is attached as Exhibit *<B". 
4. The Renter did not vacate the premises after being served with the Notice, and is still 
in possession of the premises. Under these circumstances, the Owner has the right to recover 
possession of the premises through court action with court costs, treble damages, and attorney's 
fees, if applicable. 
Therefore, the Owner asks the court to give judgement against the Renter as follows: 
1. Ordering the Renter to move-out, and allowing the Owner to retake possession of the 
premises; 
2. If necessary, ordering the Sherrif to forcibly evict the Renter, and turn over the 
\ V M V 
possession to the Owner (Order of Restitution); 
3. Finding the amount of past-due rent due to the Owner, together with treble damages, 
court costs, and attorney's fees, if applicable. 
Dated this 28th Day of Julv 19 97. 
OWNER 
Exhibits: A - Rental Agreement 
B - 3-Day Notice 
vy,3 
CASE NUMBER 970005271 {Civil} 
Refunded: 
Balance: 
1,000.00 
0.00 
TRUST DETAIL 
Trust Description 
Recipient 
Amount Due 
Paid In 
Paid Out 
TRUST DETAIL 
Trust Description 
Recipient 
Amount Due 
Paid In 
Paid Out 
TRUST DETAIL 
Trust Description: 
Recipient: 
Amount Due: 
Paid In: 
Paid Out: 
Bail/Bond Refund 
MICHAEL SHIELDS 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
Other Trust 
MARIA SANTANA 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
Other Trust 
JOHN MANGUM 
168.80 
168.80 
168.80 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
37.00 
37.00 
Review on 01/27/9 
07-30-97 Filed: Complaint 
07-30-97 Judge FRATTO assigned. 
07-30-97 Fee Account created Total Due: 
07-30-97 COMPLAINT 0K-2K Payment Received: 
07-30-97 Began tracking Return Date 
07-30-97 THREE DAY SUMMONS SIGNED-JUDGE MK BURTON. 
08-01-97 GAVE THREE DAY SUMMONS TO CONSTABLE "MAC" TO SERVE 
08-05-97 FILED: OWNER'S MOTION TO SET AMOUNT FOR BOND. 
08-06-97 SIGNED ORDER SETTING BOND $1000 - JCF 
08-06-97 ISSUED: ALIAS 3 DAY SUMMONS 
08-11-97 FILED: DEF'S ANSWER AND VERIFIED COUNTERCLAIM; AFF. OF IMPECUN 
08-11-97 IOSITY; NOTICE OF RECORDS DEPOSITION; AND THREE SUBPOENAS DUCES 
08-11-97 TECUM. 
08-13-97 Bail Account created Total Due: 1000.00 
08-13-97 Bail Posted Payment Received: 1,000.00 
Note: OWNERS BOND 
08-13-97 BAVE OWNER'S BOND TO CONSTABLE SINDT TO SERVE. 
08-19-97 FILED: ALIAS SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED 8-6-97 
08-19-97 FILED: OWNER'S BOND AND NOTICE TO RENTER ON RETURN - SERVED 
08-19-97 8-15-97 
convert 
convert 
kimm 
8kimm 
ellens 
ellens 
ellens 
vonamae 
gailj 
-ellens 
ellens 
ellens 
convert 
kimm 
ellens 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
Printed: 09/23/98 13:25:08 Page 3 
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Maria Cristina Santana (7300) 
Attorney and Acting Pro Se 
PO Box 520493 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152 
(801)484-1449/485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL V. SHIELDS, 
Plaintiff (Owner) 
vs. 
MARIA [CRISTINA] SANTANA, 
Defendant (Renter) 
MARIA CRISTINA SANTANA, 
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff 
vs. 
MICHAEL V. SHIELDS, 
DARLENE GREEN, KEVIN GREEN, 
individuals; JUANITA INVESTMENT, 
a limited partnership, and PARKSEDE 
APARTMENTS, a division of 
Juanita Investments. 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER 
AND VERIFIED 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Case No. 970005271 
Judge: Michael Burton 
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Maria Cristina Santana, 
acting in pro se, in answering the complaint of Plaintiff Michael V. Shields, admits, denies, 
avers and alleges as follows: 
\:4 
ANSWER 
1. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the Plaintiffs 
complaint, the Defendant admits that she rented the premises at 2588 S. 900 E. #36, SLC, 
UT 84106 under a rental agreement. Defendant further admits that she agreed to pay rent 
beginning in August 1, 1996 and that a security deposit of $500 was paid. Defendant 
denies that she agreed to pay rent for the months of February, March, April, May, June, or 
July 1997, along with subsequent months/pursuant to an agreement between Plaintiffs 
Agent and Apartment Manager, Darlene Green, who contracted under a fee agreement to 
pay or cancel rent in consideration of Defendant's legal representation of her daughter 
whom Defendant had never met at the time of the agreement. 
2. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the Plaintiffs 
complaint, the Defendant denies that she failed to pay $215 in rent for July 1997, and 
asserts that Manager Darlene Green represented to Defendant and her own daughter, 
Patricia Middleton, whom Defendant represents in a separate action, that she had "taken 
care" of the rent on July 7, 1997 as per the contract mentioned above. Defendant further 
alleges that Darlene Green subsequently left town and had her husband Kevin Green 
inform them that she had only partially performed under the contract by paying $300 of 
the rent on July 18, 1997. Patricia Middleton subsequently attempted to remedy her 
mother's breach by tendering payment of $215 on July 21, 1997 and again July 23, 1997 to 
Kevin Green, but he refused to accept the money and told her "Mike" wanted to evict 
Defendant instead. 
3. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Plaintiffs 
complaint, the Defendant denies that a 3 day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate was properly 
served in that Kevin Green did not mail the notice as he certified, and that Kevin Green 
who was acting as manager is a party to the eviction and therefore served the notice in 
violation of U.C.A. 78-36-6. r 
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4. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the plaintiffs 
complaint, the Defendant admits she has not vacated the premises but denies every other 
allegation contained therein. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
First Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of illegality in that 
plaintiffs agents, Darlene Green, the manager who signed the rental agreement, and Kevin 
Green, who served the 3 Day Notice, receive public housing vouchers which Plaintiff 
redeems and then pays monetary compensation to the Greens to act as managers in 
violation of U.C.A. 76-8-1201. This coun should not reward Plaintiffs Public Assistance 
Fraud by enforcing or rendering the benefits of any pleading, right or contract connected 
to his relationship and fraudulent schemes with Darlene and Kevin Green. 
Second Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of Plaintiffs and 
Plaintiffs agents' retaliation against Defendant for her knowledge and/or potential access 
to information concerning their fraudulent and criminal activities in connection with Public 
Assistance Fraud in violation of U.C.A. 76-8-1201. 
Third Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of Plaintiffs and 
Plaintiffs agents' retaliation against Patricia Middleton, Darlene Green's daughter, by 
evicting her attorney, the Defendant, for telling the attorney about her mother's public 
assistance fraud during the course of their attorney-client relationship. 
Fourth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of Plaintiffs and 
Plaintiffs agents' retaliation against Defendant because Darlene and Kevin Green were 
unable to search her apartment for evidence of this knowledge after Defendant changed 
3 
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the lock on her door when she caught Kevin Green entering the apanment with a pass key 
one morning as she slept and he believed her to be out of town. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and laches in that 
he intentionally refuses to allow tenants to know his name or where he can be contacted 
which effectively prevented Defendant access to him and caused her to detrimentally rely 
solely on the representations of Darlene and Kevin Green. 
Sixth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of Plaintiffs and 
Plaintiffs agents' fraudulent misrepresentations and material omissions to this Court which 
include but are not limited to the Plaintiffs representation that his address is 2588 South 
900 East #21 which is, in fact, the address of managers Darlene and Kevin Green and not 
the residence of Plaintiff who actually resides at 4514 South Parkview Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84124. Upon information and belief, these misrepresentations are made to Welfare 
and Public Housing in order to conceal that Darlene and Kevin Green's utilities and 
telephone are in the name of Michael Shields and Parkside Apartments This Court should 
not reward Plaintiffs brazen transfer of those misrepresentations unto this Court and 
should not award the relief sought. 
Seventh Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of Plaintiffs and 
Plaintiffs agents' breach of contract and bad faith and breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
Eighth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of Plaintiffs and 
Plaintiffs agents' acts, including fraudulent misrepresentations and material omissions, that 
constitute constructive fraud. 
Ninth Affirmative Defense 
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Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of Plaintiff 
accepting payment of $300 from his agent Darlene Green for Defendant's rent, in panial 
performance of the contract for legal services, and thereby ratifying the contract between 
his agent and Defendant. Plaintiff and his agents are indebted to Defendant under the fee 
agreement in excess of $3,000 and she is entitled to an offset against the rent 
Tenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of Plaintiffs and 
Plaintiffs agents' negligent misrepresentations. 
Eleventh Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of the fact Plaintiffs 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not accepting tender of rent three days after the 3 day 
Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a 
result of plaintiffs failure to cooperate in Defendant's performance. 
Twelfth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of Plaintiffs and 
Plaintiffs agents' abuse of power and violation of Defendant's rights in that Darlene and 
Kevin Green attempted and did, in fact, enter Defendant's apartment numerous times 
without Defendant's prior knowledge or permission 
Thirteenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of Plaintiffs and 
Plaintiffs agents' negligence and bad faith in employing Kevin Green, knowing he served 
17 years in prison for rape and attempted murder, and giving him a pass key to 
Defendant's apartment; in providing no information on who tenants could contact when 
they had problems with the Greens; and in intentionally shielding himself from all 
responsibilities while accepting all the benefits of the rental leases. 
Fourteenth Affirmative Defense 
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Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of his agent, 
Darlene Green's, abuse of power in attempting to coerce Defendant to accept her breach 
of the fee agreement and continue representing her daughter without payment of legal fees 
or be evicted 
Fifteen Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are released, void or unenforceable as a result of Plaintiffs and 
Plaintiffs agents' breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment and implied covenant of 
habitabdity 
COUNTERCLAIM 
JURISDICTION AND VENT IF 
1 The Counterclaim Plaintiff, Maria Santana, is an individual who is and was 
at all relevant times matenal to this counterclaim a resident of the State of Utah, residing 
in Salt Lake County 
2 The Counterclaim Defendants, Michael V Shields. Darlene Green, Kevin 
Green, Juanita Investment and Parkside Apartments are indispensable parties to this action 
and are properly brought m pursuant to Rule 13 (a) & (g) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
3 The Counterclaim Defendants, Michael V Shields, Darlene Green, and 
Kevin Green are individuals who are and were at all relevant times matenal to this 
counterclaim residents of the State of Utah, residing in Salt Lake County 
4 The Counterclaim Defendants, Juanita Investment, is a Limited Partnership 
registered with the Division of Corporations in Salt Lake City, and Parkside Apartments is 
a division of Juanita Investment, whose principal places of business are and were in Salt 
Lake City at all relevant times matenal to this counterclaim 
5 Venue is properly laid in the Third Judicial Distnct Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, in accordance with Utah Code Ann Sec 78-13-14 (1953 as 
amended) 
! 
General Allegations 
1. On July 12, 1996, Maria Santana (hereafter "Tenant Santana") moved into 
Parkside Apartments and entered a six month rental lease with manager Darlene Green 
(hereafter "Manager Green"). Five days later, Darlene Green delivered a release of 
liability agreement to Plaintiff which she refused to sign because she had already moved in 
and would not have rented the apartment had she known that signing away her rights was 
required. (See Exhibit A.) 
2. Tenant Santana asked Manager Green several times during the tenancy for 
information about the actual owner because there was no reference to who he might be in 
any of the forms provided by Parkside Apartments. Manager Green told Tenant Santana 
that his name was "Mike" and that he did not want anything to do with tenants so she 
could not share his address or telephone number. Manager Green told Tenant Santana 
that she made all the decisions, could do anything she wanted at Parkside Apartments, was 
in charge of every aspect of managing the building and "Mike" would sell the property if 
she ever left. 
3. Manager Darlene Green and her husband Kevin Green live at Parkside 
Apartments in the same complex as Tenant Santana. They live at the address which 
Owner Michael V. Shields claims in his eviction complaint is his address: 2588 South 900 
East, #21 , SLC, UT. Tenant Santana has never met Michael V. Shields. He does not live 
there. 
4. In January 1997, Manager Green asked Tenant Santana, who is an 
attorney, if she were willing to represent her daughter, whom Tenant Santana had never 
met, in a domestic civil action. Manager Green said her daughter had contacted lawyers 
and found none who would take her case without a large retainer up front. She told 
Tenant Santana that her daughter was in a desperate situation and that if she took her 
daughter's case without a retainer, she would "take care of the rent" during the course of 
the representation. She said she could do anything she wanted at Parkside Apartments. 
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5. In early February 1997, Tenant Santana, Manager Green and her daughter, 
Patricia Middleton met to discuss representation. They entered a fee agreement which 
included Manager Green's guarantee that Tenant Santana's $515 rent would be "taken care 
o f during the representation and a standard hourly rate paid on a flexible schedule over a 
period of time. Manager Green said she would perform her part of the agreement but 
could not put it in writing because she was involved in a personal injury lawsuit. Tenant 
Santana drafted a fee agreement reflecting the terms of the agreement and Patricia 
Middleton signed and acknowledged that she had entered the agreement and witnessed her 
mother had entered the same agreement but could not sign because of her personal injury 
lawsuit." (See Exhibit B.) 
6. Because the meeting between Manager Green, Patricia Middleton and 
Tenant Santana took place a few days after Tenant Santana had already paid rent for 
February, Manager Green gave Tenant Santana $150 in cash toward her daughter's out of 
pocket costs in lieu of cancelling the rent already paid. 
7. During February, March, April, May, June, July and August 1997, Tenant 
Santana represented Manager Green's daughter in six court hearings and approximately 
150 billable hours. Those billable hours do not include time wasted when Manager Green 
knocked on Tenant Santana's door and called almost daily to discuss her daughter's case 
and offer advice and testimony. 
8. Manager Green continued to disturbed Tenant Santana's work despite 
repeated requests that she not knock because if she was home she was probably on the 
telephone with clients and lawyers and did not want them to hear the doorbell or 
knocking. Manager Green continued seeking her and knocking unabated even after 
Tenant Santana placed a note on the door. (See Exhibit C.) 
9. Manager Green did not "take care o f the rent for February, March, April, 
May, June, July or August 1997, claiming each month that she was waiting for a check 
from California and a check from her personal injury suit that had not arrived and which 
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1. If the RENTER does nothing for three (3) days after he has been served with the 
Notice of Bond, the OWNER has the right under the law to have the sheriff forcibly move 
the RENTER and his property out of the premises. Therefore, if the RENTER does not 
intend to contest the action, he should consider vacating the premises voluntarily 
within the 3-day period. 
2. If the eviction action is based only on non-payment of rent, the RENTER may pay 
the back rent in full to the OWNER within the three (3) days, along with any late fees and 
court costs, and this will reinstate the rental agreement. This means the RENTER may 
stay in the premises on the same arrangement as before the eviction lawsuit was filed. 
However, if the eviction is based on some other violation of the rental agreement, such 
as doing damage to the premises, then this remedy will not apply. 
3. If the RENTER wants to keep possession of the premises, and does not agree 
with the OWNER'S complaint that he, the RENTER, violated the rental agreement, he 
can keep possession by filing a counterbond within three (3) days from the date he 
received the Notice. The procedure for filing this bond is to first fill out the form called 
"RENTER'S MOTION TO SET AMOUNT FOR COUNTERBOND," and submit it to the 
clerk. The clerk can tell you where to get forms. The judge will set an amount for the 
bond. He will base it on his estimate of the OWNER'S costs of suit and damages for 
being deprived of possession, in the event the OWNER wins the case. Any prepaid rent 
will be considered as a portion of the total amount of the counterbond. 
After learning the amount, the RENTER may then file a counterbond with the clerk 
of the court, in one of the following ways: 
Corporate Bond Property Bond 
Cash Bond Certified Funds, Payable to Clerk 
When this is done, the RENTER may keep possession of the premises until the 
trial. At that time the final decision will be made by the judge as to whether the RENTER 
must vacate. 
4. The RENTER may file a form demanding a hearing to be held during the 3-day 
period which began when he was served with the Notice to Renter. This may be done 
instead of posting a counterbond. 
At the hearing the judge will decide who should have possession of the premises. If 
the judge decides in the OWNER'S favor, the sheriff will promptly be sent to evict the 
RENTER. If the judge decides to leave the RENTER in possession, but further questions 
remain to be decided in a later trial, he may require the RENTER to post a counterbond. 
The 3-day period does not count Saturday or Sunday, or a legal holiday, or the day 
of service. For example, if the RENTER is served on Friday, March 6, he will have until 
5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, March 11, to take action. (Civil Rule 6, U.R.C.P.) 
The procedures described above are set out in Utah Code Annotated 78-36-8.5. If 
you have questions about how they apply to your case, you should consult an attorney. 
The clerk or judge can explain court procedures, but cannot give legal advice. 
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Owner's Name: Michael V. Shields OWNER'S BOND 
Address: 2588 S. 900 E. #21 SLC, UT 84106 
Telephone: 466-8996 NOTICE TO RENTER 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
5022 S. STATE STREET, MURRAY, UT 84107 
Michael V. Shields 
Plaintiff (OWNER), 
vs. 
Maria Santana 
Defendant (RENTER) 
j 
OWNER'S BOND 2 
• i 
NOTICE TO RENTER -I • 
Case No. r ? - J3 
970005271 
This bond, or the corporate bond attached, represents security posted with the court tft 
protect the RENTER for his damages, in the case the OWNER takes possession of the premises 
at this address: 2588 S. 900 E. #36 SLC. UT 84106 (Storerooms are included). 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
PROPERTY BOND 
We, the undersigned, are residents of \D A1ST M\-K£ County, Sate of Utah, and we each 
own real property in that county. We jointly and severally undertake the obligation of this bond 
in the sum oi%f&VD'Cf0 Dollars, and we shall pay all costs and damages which may be 
awarded to the RENTER, not exceeding the sum undertaken. We state that each of us has a net 
worth (above debts and real property) more than the sum undertaken. 
Date Signature of Surety Signature of Surety 
Date Signature of OWNER 
Subscribed and sworn before me on this date: 
i Signature of Court Notary Public 
grf+* TIME /£*gf 
r?gy ^ &>* r ** yf 
UPON TZ^sc^ 
SlfJQIIlQMSTABLE 8 1 . COUNTY, UTAH 
- ^ — " ^ HCDllTV 
CASH BOND 
The OWNER has (check one) Pa^ d cash to, o r ^ . Has certified funds payable to the clerk 
of this court in the sum of$ /Q(^? - to be held vyhi[e.this suit is pending, and to be used 
to pay any court costs and damages which may be aw^dedVthe RENTER. 
Dated this Dav of AUC * 3 Wfo , LiJL&L 
NOTICE TO R E N T E R ^ ^ ^ c 
The OWNER has filed with the court a bond (copy is above or attached) which will 
permit him to take possession of the premises you are now occupying. 
At this point you as RENTER have certain rights, or alternative courses of action, any of 
which must be accomplished within three (3) days from service of this notice, which may be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Vacate the premises; 
2. Pay the back rent, costs, 
3. File a Counterbond; 
4. Demand a hearing. 
These alternatives are explained more fully on the attached page. You may also wish to 
consult an attorney to advise you. 
Dated this JOihiay of J u ^ L ' ^ . ^ ^ ^ tf J ^ j D 
PLAINTIFF (OWNER) 
•<& 
N 
;i! 
> ' i l PVI- I •"• 
lant Jin Possession -J- ...., . . . , .., . .. 
Apartment Association of Utah 
NOTICE i ; i 
•t1 ••{ .5 ;: 
II 
' Ten  i i  - ; "I ..];i|; iiJU ^-i: v 
j:;^^j|i ip^l-igfdJA>(^^i.i 
;!^ii|(l:jjnhU;:(b:State^j^df •:;( J ^ tf| i.j Zip ill" • '»: «• . 
.ii4iNt|f!i|<H<# iJ?|tt, i |U( r!J l U v ; J f t ; ! .1 i ::. 
will Pleasetake, notice jthat as,of the fv \^-r* dav of 4jp^SdJL5juL [ p e ) [  "of ' j M ^ V f ftpAy x « s ^ - : : i . 1 9 ^ j ^ : the end of 
|ejija|J^grjodijyo^righjvt40 gcpupy £he|peemises at the{above°address, which premises, you now occupy as 
undereignedl'wiirbe'terminatedand yWare'herebyfreqWed to vacate said prefnises'on or before said date 
be unlawfully;* 
„._.„_,_.-,. _.,_..._
 r._._. ... r . . . 1953, you will 
lorltreble'jdamages forsuch,junlawfuj detainer and action will be commenced against you to evict you,from said 
ifr., .. t t and to take judgment 'against'you*for any rent accrued arid for damages of three (times the Tent for the period 
;;f-4 ,'you were unlawfully detaining possession of said,: premises, the damage assessed by the court for unlawful detainer, 
[^^.[togetheijwith court costs and -attorney's* fees.' ; ' t r* l l, ! • f ''} r 
M\:\[Dated this f .34 W dav of llMXQAA<J^ 'I - . 1 9 M ^ | ; 
Mm 
mm I 
]f:/ if Owner or Managing Agent's Signature \<r a 
I t * ' S A H H r A ^ I . ' i l .'/' l i l i, ' • J.ii! •: J , ; . • , 
.'Ml 
II: ^ NWir-4'ill'J?H^:'f;^*< .:* .!< ' 'I :. r ! . . . f | • . : • • ' < « i : 
|fc M •»« k C :so« M J:State:> ' I -I "f'lri* j -):••.« i, Zip 
• » - 4 j V r * ' i ^ \\> »$ . - j * " t * •* * • • : • • • r » : : ! 
'! i|u t'i i.i U 'Mi t l i t raww* h ,n ; . i - r . 
,i Mil'); .'• ' / 'H?* ' . *••'»• ; 
•:(!?• r i ^ - i l . 
ij> |lt shatl be unlawful for'a'ny'person upon vacating or removing frprr\ dwellings, store rooms/or any other building, to fail to remove all garbage, rubbish, and 
j/;« i; ' gashes froni such building and premises and,also the ground appertaining thereto, or to fail to place same in a thoroughly sanitary condition 24 hours after said 
.Hi-
 :'fi premiseslshaH be vacated. ;j ' \' H| ..('.|;.' ;!••; . ,• 'j \*i .•• v •• \\ i i ;: - •••: , • •.- i ' 
1 HiWMIt'ili l i !? : : j \r : \M;kv. ' !- ! . i --H* l>-'- : 
I { m f - i * ™ < • • • ' ' • * • ' • > • • • • - ••••• 
^ •! > - 5 : 
I v •M-'?!»i 
^H 3!i 
J it •! :• W' w: 2 
M i •! i;| . I 
.!!;. :;i-:i;V.; : 
' ! : ; • : 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
I certify jthat i service of .this notice was completed: in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-36-3 and 
Sectipn 78-36-6; Utah Code^Annotated,' 1953,'on! 
If!'!'' . f | r . U . 
U• ;i g-.n, ^leaving la jcopyj with{:>«. =Tl^- ' IM' ::*. :- j .v 
i*Hii 8 r^esi^ enpe!iDrfplace o^  business.land by mailing a Second 
| f i jD •«ffl«rlB8 
1?»Subscribed and sworn to before me on thisl -' 
copy In a conspicuous place'on the 
Xdate)^ 
.by: 
2 at (place). 
I »
 r; • delivering a 'copy to Untenant personally, | }f ijOR| ^-|J . . , ; , -, 
i:.;, iv D ; sending a copy through'certified or registered mail, addressed to the tenant at his place of residence, 
' j a person j of suitable age and, discretion at the tenant's 
copy to the tenant at said residence! or place of business. . 
O R ' •;• •'": " '• • • , n - '•: •; : ; ' • ' • ! ; • ' 
•
(li:d ii-. .i MrtA-. :V'i • =-: 
rented premises; after failing to find anyone there. 
i\4-m J ,.» allii* «.« :.*; 
iiiiii ission expires 
Mil 
iflflilfNI!!! 
3?' 
Signature of ServeH | f j 
!:' I 'f ii!:-:;'1 { > 
:!.!ti.r: 
U-W dLvofil ' ^ ' i i iM' :. !• ; .T i l i r * - i9 - . 
ireslding i H i - | t ! ^;]!!J:i|j<rMsiiijiiM*!iH»:|i(||j||ir: f^ .J jsiding at J >»f -> *« ».<i ^ t;- '•• I ' I !»*•«» * }> y -
8i Jiiiyj^ iifrHijI t"f !!f 5 i ' ; ' :. • ' 
! !# ' • ; ; ; 
,1 ' 
1987 The Apartment Association of Utah > 
Unauthorized reproduction 
of this form is illegal. 1991 
^iv^pS^.^^^^^^:3^^v#^§:i::^ ••$%&#. 
-'
:
^vH?%0^^:':'¥^ 
?v**i%k&r.-r^ 
'< V -
; ••V^fe^ :v^ V 
. »
; :
^ ^ ' i - ' . . . ^ ' • ' " < • ' • • • • • 
^ ^ ^-"?C'..:•..?v'^-. •". 
• • • : $ £ £ ;':^ 
.. •>&* i'vH.-
* . ' . " "• ' - • • ? • 
;•;-. •-• .;;i?iV 
;'<^;-%-
•^f^IN THE: THIRD DISTRICT COURT, DEPARTMENT II 
t;::@Tp > STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
-0O0-
MICHAEL^V .% SHIELDS , 
•';$• 'C^M. ^^^f^^mmm^ :-^'l • ",:•.: •-: '•. - Civil No. 970005271 
• "%-$«*^-:j?l££fa& <•*• ^ Judge Michaer Burton 
r' I".-. irC^.* 
TRANSCRIPT fOF^RUIJNG'^S*£f 
_-_.„. , .
 t..., ,,.,... . - . ON M O T I O N / ^ ^ m ^ ^ 
¥%&?:* 1 Def eridant ^0^^*:$£**^$K^ «*5f3?*:\-*<; ^ ^s^r*:'-^^ '^^ ''^ ''^ ->•• 
itl'MARiAff CRISTINA^SANTANA;'- ^ ^ t - ^ ^ 
l 1 * - • ' r . ^ ' £ ^ ^ ^ ^ ? ^ ^ ^ ; v ; * -P- v . ; . ; v$^;? : .•••J^-ON OTION - ^ - ^ ^ ^ . ^ V S : ; ••;#%& 
1' K u i !•: 1 1? 1.. ILiLJJ 
THE COURT: I I 11 i 111- my i n i t i a l r eac t ion i s : We are a 
Iliiierdl
 t 1 iriiii,iesi! , ;i l(l inici!:,.,icie plf?atl J rii'i s t a t e there i s t h i s 
i ssue of notice that ought to be followed. 
'ANGUM: We understand , 
THE COURT: And 1 think on the issue of this 
7 | r e s I r a i r 11.1111 i»i i il i • i «i m 11 I I 111• q \ i a s h i n (] o f; t h e s u b p o e n a s , 
8 Mr. Orifici makes a point, and I think I en-'4- ignore :*• ••>*»+-
9 they1']! : e no t roperly before me right now. 
3 0 I think it is fair at this juncture, if the informa-
11 tion has not beei i divulged • y Uiese institutions, to grant an 
12 order staying the implementation of the subpoenas until at 
13 least September 20. And I just pick that day, i t gi v es every-
14 body a chance to come i n and talk about it I f tl ley wai it. So I 
15 will order that, an order staying. 
16 ' But on the issue of the ultimate quashing of the 
17 subpoena or the restraining against Ms. Santana for acts that 
18 some people think she may or may not have committed or wiJ 
19 commit, x u. think it1s.before me at this juncture. So 
20 that!s my ruling o^ *-+**+• ^ne You can have an order that 
21 allows jou until September 20 but after that, if nothing's 
22 been done, no resolution reachei
 alleac|# 
23 All right. To me then—I've answered some questions 
24 and the question really comes .down to is: C les Ms. Santana 
25 get to stay in the place or leave? The issues of damages 
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clearly, either on the counterclaim or on any claim by the 
plaintiff here, ought to be reserved until a later date. But 
I am going to order at this juncture that a writ of 
restitution be issued on behalf of the plaintiff. And the 
reason I do this is as follows. 
Number one, I have no evidence that any rent beyond 
the $300 was ever tendered and so there's clearly no failure 
to accept that tender of rent. So I find as a matter of fact 
that she was $215 behind in her July rent. I've already found 
that she was properly served a three-day notice to pay or 
quit. It's clear that she continues to possess the property 
and she is in unlawful detainer and the plaintiff has supplied 
the bond. She ought to be—and on that issue of possession, 
it ought to go to the plaintiff. 
I don't know if I need to be more specific, but on 
this issue of habitability it's clear to me that no evidence 
has been presented to me along the lines of what Utah 
recognizes as a covenant of habitability that anything has 
ever been done as regards Ms. Santana and her occupancy there 
to say that these folks violated the covenant of habitability. 
And I don't know if there are other issues that I 
need to answer, but I'd like to do that if there are any that 
you think, Mr. Mangum, ought to be answered today. 
So it's just a simple answer. The plaintiff can have 
the property back, a writ of restitution can issue, that all 
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damages are reserved c~ oa^h ei'Hp ar 
gaiiM J., ivui."' except Utxta st - -,14 , quashing of * r,> 
subpoena. 
. MANGUM: Understood, Your Honor. I do have a--
THE COURT: Do you have any otner LS:-ue; chdl — 
MANGUM: —form of order for writ of rest— 
THE COURT: Do you have any othei 1.11L.11*•:. tlua. ymi 
I hi ill I fn'ed to answer? 
MH MANGUM: Not at this point. 
THE COURT: Mr. Orifici, is there something I missed 
on your end— 
MR. ORIFICI: Honor. 
THE COURT: —that I nee*., l.i .JUS AJLX 
right
 JU. v= ^ -i something to sign? 
MR. MANGUM: An order <v resi.u.m u f the premises. 
THE COURT: If I may get a look at it. 
MR. MANGUM: If I could just vet My, Yimt Hnnor. 1 
did have to make an interlineation on Point aad the 
wrong unit number specified thei -eaU 
Unit JO WJ. v 
THE COURT: a 
MR. MANGUM: it should say 36, not Unit 21. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MANGUM: That's my mistake and I apologize. 
THE COURT: : . Wei i , , |n.m to serve 
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her today? 
MR. SHIELDS: Please. 
MR. MANGUM: We would like her to be served here in 
open court. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, I mean, this issue of when I'm 
going to order her out, she has three days from today. 
MR. SHIELDS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: So I guess we should make it conform. 
Restore possession thereafter to the plaintiff on the—let's 
see. Well, Ms. Santana, they're going to serve you today on 
this order of restitution. 
MS. SANTANA: That's fine. I accept. 
THE COURT: And we're at 5:30 and today's the 25th, 
so—let's see, you get 26, 27 and 28, so by the 29th day of 
August at 5:30 p.m. That, by my calculation, is three days 
from today, not counting today's date as the date of service— 
it being the day of service. 
And then, Ms. Santana, you folks have the right to 
appeal, obviously, and the right to contest the order if it's 
done within three days of the order and, of course, the right 
to appeal pursuant to the statute. 
MR. MANGUM: Your Honor, a point of clarification. 
Three business days, if we understand it, from today, being 
the 25th, would be the 28th. Have we miscounted? 
THE COURT: Well, I've got it the 26th, 27th and 
1 128th , thr ee t o ] eav c i 31 , • j < s a t i :)]l :a} Tl: ,,e 2:81 . 
MR. MANGUM: Thank you. 
THE 
|Do i on have a copy of this for them? 
Mli" MANGUM ' i Vn I I II "II! i oil hi qet f h.)l 
I conformed. 
THE COURT 
[questions you might have? 
MR. ORIF1C1 Nun in- M M I II ill t h i ink m l , i in Honioi 
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The only thing I would like to do is just request a tape 
transcri fit: 
THE COURT: Carolyn, hov is that done? Now on the 
transcript, w e giv e u---wc ni.il c .1 copy 
of the tape and then you just work u cranscription part. 
(Discussion ' * obtai 
MR. ORIFICI: We appreciate your time and considera-
tion
 / Your Honor. 
THE COURT: No problem. Thank yc~ 
MR. MANGUM: Thank you, Your Honoi, j.ui your 
attention to this matter. 
THE COURT: Everything else is reserved for and at a 
later date. 
(This ends the requested portion of this hearing.) 
* * * 
* * * 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, Rashell Garcia, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public within and for the County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing tape-recorded proceedings were trans-
cribed into typewriting under my direction and supervision and 
that the foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcrip-
tion of said proceedings to the best of my ability to do so. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed by name and 
affixed my seal this 19th day of January 1998. 
RASHELL GARCIA/CTS.R. 
License No. 144 
Notary Public " 1 
RASHELL GARCIA . 
36 South State Street I 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 , 
My Commission Expires | 
December 15.2000 
— State^ofJJtah _ _J 
/ 
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08-27-97 FILED 
08-27-97 FILED 
08-27-97 FILED 
08-27-97 FILED: MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER vona 
08-27-97 FILED: ORDER OF RESTITUTION W/NOTICE OF ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE vone 
08-27-97 FROM JOSEPH F ORIFICE vona 
AFFOF MICHAEL V SHIELDS vone 
AFF OF VAN HALE vona 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER vona 
08-27-97 FILED; AFF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL MOTION FOR 10 DAYvona 
08-27-97 STAY OF WRIT AND OBJECTION TO QUASHING SUBPOENA DUCES vona 
08-27-97 FILED: DEFT MOTIO FOR NEW TRIAL vona 
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08-27-97 BURTON, ENDORSE CHECK FOR $168.80 OVER TO MR MANGUM mary 
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09-02-97 OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING MOTION TO DISM. COUNTER- elle 
09-02-97 CLAIMS. elle 
09-02-97 FILED: DEF'S MOTION FOR ATTYS. FEES AND OBJECTION TO MOTION FORelle 
09-02-97 PROTECTIVE ORDER AND QUASHING OF SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM W/O NOTICEelle 
09-02-97 AND MEMO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTYS. FEES AND OBJECTION TO elle 
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09-03-97 Ended tracking of, Partial Payments lind 
09-05-97 ISS: WRIT RESTITUTION vona 
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09-05-97 84117 gail 
09-05-97 FILED: PLA'S OBJECTION TO FORM i : EF S PROPOSED ORDER STAYING elle: 
09-05-97 WRIT OF RESTITUTION FOR TEN DAYS. elle: 
09-08-97 ENTERED: ORDER STAYING WRIT OF RESTIT. SIGNED JUDGE MK BURTON, elle: 
09-08-97 ENTERED: ORDER RELEASING BOND (TO PLA) SIGNED JUDGE MK BURTON, elle: 
09-09-97 Began tracking Partial Payments Review on 09/l0/97elle: 
09-09-97 FILED: PLA'S MEMO OPPOSING DEF SANTANA'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, elle! 
09-09-97 FILED: PLA'S MEMO OPPOSING MO. OF DEF FOR ATTY. FEES AND elle: 
09-09-97 RESPONDING TO DEF'S OBJECTION TO PLA'S MO. FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER elle: 
09-09-97 AND QUASHING OF SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM. elle] 
09-10-97 Bail Refunded Payment Received: '?• 00 lindi 
Note: Refund of bai-
09-10-97 Trust Account created Total Due: lindi 
09-10-97 Ended tracking of Partial Payments lindi 
09-19-97 FILED: STIPULATION FOR ORDER CONTINUING STAY OF SUBPOENAS DUCESellei 
09-19-97 TECUM AND RECORDS DEPOSITION. ellei 
09-19-97 ENTERED: ORDER CONTINUING STAY OF SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM AND ellei 
09-19-97 RECORDS DEPOSITION SIGNED JUDGE MK BURTON. ellei 
09-19-97 *** PER JUDGE MK BURTON: CASE TO BE SET FOR MOTIONS HEARING. **ellei 
09-23-97 HEARING scheduled on October 24, 1997 at 01:30 PM in Room 103 
with Judge BURTON. ellei 
10-24-97 FILED: DEF'S REQUEST FOR CONT. ellei 
10-24-97 MKB/LJV (TAPE 97 579/CT 450) PLAINTIFF PRESENT WITHOUT lindc 
10-24-97 COUNSEL. DEFT NOT PRESENT. COURT ORDERED CASE CONTINUED. lindi 
10-27-97 Fee Account created Total Due: 0 n A conve 
10-27-97 MISCELLANEOUS FEE Payment Received: t holl} 
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John K. Mangum, USB No. 2072 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendants Michael V. Shields, 
Juanita Investment and Parkside Apartments 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL V. SHIELDS, ] 
Plaintiff (Owner), ) 
vs. ) 
MARIA SANTANA, ] 
Defendant (Renter). 
MARIA CRISTINA SANTANA, ] 
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff, ] 
VS.
 4 
MICHAEL V. SHIELDS, DARLENE ] 
GREEN, KEVIN GREEN, individuals, ] 
JUANITA INVESTMENT, a limited 
partnership and PARKSIDE 
APARTMENTS, a division of Juanita 
Investments, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
I JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF AGAINST 
1 DEFENDANT 
1 Civil No. 970005271 
) Judge Michael Burton 
74447.SH374.008 
At the end of a hearing held August 25, 1997, where Plaintiff and Defendant were each 
represented by legal counsel, the Court entered an Order of Restitution in favor of Plaintiff requiring 
Defendant Santana i i I.IIII v< lien «> rll fiorii ilic siibfccl premises no later than 5:30 p.m. on August 
28,1997. No determination was then made concerning whether Plaintiff was entitled to damages 
or as to the amount thereof. Subsequently, that Order of Restitution was stayed temporarily but was 
othe 1997. 
Upon proper notice, a follow-up hearing was held October 31, 1997, at which Plaintiff and 
Counterclaim Defendants Michael V. Shields, Juanita Investments and Parkside Apartments IA e 11 
represents! In J^lin I* h\tit\[ um ul Nielsen & Senior, and Defendant represented herself pro se, to 
address all motions then pending and to determine if Plaintiff was then entitled to damages and, if 
so, the amount thereof. Having reviewed all of the memoranda and other submissions made, 
heard and considei* • , " ['Milics, for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Counterclaims previously asserted by Defendant Santana, MMIIUI ..I;. Ilm, '«> r 
j.sserk'd agdiiiM M" I".it I >'ln M1, IN JI«I1 I I n v e s t m e n t s a n d P a r k s i d e A p a r t m e n t s , a r e h e r e b y 
dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motions 
/ 7 1 c)*i "I for new trial and for attorney fees are hereby denied. 
3. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following identified subpoenas are hereby 
quashed and declared void and unenforceable: 
a. That certain Subpoena Duces Tecum issued in this action by Defendant and 
Counterclaim PlaintifFMaria Christina Santana, dated August 10,1997, originally made returnable 
74447.SH374.008 2 
on August 29,1997, and directed to and served on August 11,1997 upon First Security Bank, 1095 
East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106; 
b. That certain Subpoena Duces Tecum issued in this action by Defendant and 
Counterclaim Plaintiff Maria Christina Santana, dated August 10,1997, originally made returnable 
on August 29,1997, and directed to and served on August 11,1997 upon US Bank and/or West One 
Bank, 2243 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109; 
c. That certain Subpoena Duces Tecum issued in this action by Defendant and 
Counterclaim Plaintiff Maria Christina Santana, dated August 10,1997, originally made returnable 
on August 29, 1997, and directed to and served on August 11, 1997 upon Key Bank, 3135 South 
1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
4. Having resolved all issues between Defendant Santana and Plaintiff Shields in favor 
of Plaintiff Shields, and finding no reason for delay in entering judgment in Plaintiffs favor, it is 
expressly directed, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF MICHAEL 
SHIELDS AGAINST DEFENDANT SANTANA, for each of the following sums: 
Amount Description 
$51.48 Unpaid rent at the rate of $ 17.16 per day for 
July 19,20 and 21,1997. 
$ 1,956.24 Treble damages for unlawful detainer for 
38 days beginning July 22,1997 through 
August 28,1997, at $51.48/day. 
$294.52 For unpaid portion of what should have 
been treble damage amount for the 9 day 
period, at $51.48/day, from August 29, 
1997 through September 6,1997, less 
74447.SH374.008 3 
credit for $168.80 accepted by Court for 
amount tendered late on August 27,1997. 
$84.00 Court costs of Plaintiff to date of judgment. 
$ . _ _ _ . _ . . For attorney fees and other costs of 
Plaintiffs legal counsel in obtaining 
judgment. 
$ . Prejudgment interest at statutory rate of 
10% per annum on the amounts above for 
unpaid rent and treble damages from the 
last date of each such period through date 
ofjudgment 
$ . TOTAL of Sums above 
plus Post-judgment interest at the statutory rate 
of 7.45% per annum on the judgment stated 
above until paid. 
DATED this day of October, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Michael Burton 
District Court Judge 
74447.SH374.008 4 
John K. Mangum, USB No. 2072 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff7Counterclaim Defendant Michael V. Shields 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL V. SHIELDS, ) 
Plaintiff (Owner), ) 
) AFFIDAVIT ON ATTORNEY 
vs. ) FEES FROMJOHN K. MANGUM 
MARIA SANTANA, ) 
) Civil No. 970005271 
Defendant (Renter). ) 
MARIA SANTANA, ) 
) Judge Michael Burton 
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
MICHAEL V. SHIELDS, DARLENE ) 
GREEN, KEVIN GREEN, individuals, ) 
JUANITA INVESTMENT, a limited ) 
partnership and PARKSIDE ) 
APARTMENTS, a division of Juanita ) 
Investments, ) 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COL ) 
I, JOHN 5 < ANGUM, first being duly sworn upon oath, depost ^ follows: 
1. I am an attorney admitted to the Utah State Bar in 1°80 and have been continuously 
licensed to practice law in~4iis state since then. I have been a shareholder at the law firm of Nielsen 
& Senior since 1985. Much of my practice focuses on complex civil litigation, including significant 
experience in real property matters and complex landlord tenant issues. My normal billing rate is 
$ y 
experience and time practicing law. 
2. With assistance from an associate and a paralegal, after I was brought into this case 
by anothei senior shareholder at Nielsen & Senior who has previously provided, legal counsel to 
Plaintiff Shields on mostly non-litigated matters, I have provided representation in this action to 
Plaintiff Michael V. Shields counterclaim Defendants Michael ; I illieIds, Juanita 
Investments, and Parkside Apartments. 
3. This unlawful detainer action has been unusually complex due to the number and 
Btitiiii nil iiflinii ilii ( fli'h'iist iiiHill ntiiiiiiliiii l«ni!i\ iissntnl by 1 irlniiliinl IMIhnii I 'ivliiu S.mluna, 
which are set forth in an Answer and Counterclaim running 24 pages. Defendant Santana has also 
been involved as a party defendant in a significant number of court proceedings in this county, 
including an action brought by a prior landlord against her, which has required additional time to 
review and investigate as part of the preparation of a reasonable response to the affirmative defenses 
and counterclaims asserted. 
.2-
4. Mr. Neil Sabin, my partner who handled the initial intake work on this case as a result 
of his prior work for Plaintiff Shields, has been admitted to the Utah State Bar since 1970 and his 
normal billing rate is $160.00 per hour, which is reasonable in this community for a person of his 
experience. 
5. My associate at Nielsen & Senior, Scott Ellsworth, has devoted time to legal research 
and preparing an argument and memo supporting Plaintiffs application for a protective order on 
quashing the subpoena duces tecum issued by Defendant Santana and in other tasks to help me 
prepare for hearings in this action. Mr. Ellsworth has been admitted as a licensed member of the 
Utah State Bar since October, 1996, and his time is billed at the normal and customary rate of $75.00 
per hour, which is reasonable for a person of his experience. 
6. In addition, a long-time paralegal at Nielsen & Senior, Mr. Rodney K. Dean, has 
invested time in checking court files, other documents, obtaining documents from Defendant 
Santana's Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing in late January, 1997, and in delivering an affidavit for 
signature by Mr. Van Hale. Mr. Dean's time is billed at the normal and customary rate of $60.00 
per hour, which is appropriate and reasonable for a person of his experience of more than 20 years 
as a paralegal. 
7. Excluding time after September 20,1997, to consult with clients, prepare the papers 
submitted herewith, and to finish preparation for and travel to and attend the scheduled hearing set 
for October 31,1997, and any time which may be necessary thereafter, the law firm of Nielsen & 
Senior has billed $9,492.75 in attorney fees on this case, and $321.07 in costs incurred, all itemized 
in the attached invoices, which are true and correct copies of those sent to Plaintiff. Also, an 
-3-
additional $4.80 for photocopies made, on September 19, 1997, but not picked up by the firm 
accounting system until September 22,1997, and $11 I ,00 for Westlaw research charges incurred in 
late August 1997 but not billed to Nielsen & Senior until early October, are also being billed to 
Plaintiff Shields. Thus, the total through September 20,1997 is $9,992.62 for fees and costs on this 
1 1 I Nu'lseiMV ,'ii;iiiiiif ih'iiT, tin iwikiri, \ ,ltcf. u! On in, 1 M i l l v Uictiigtw die reasonar-
the work done, which has all been occasioned by the Answer and Counterclaim of Defendant 
Santana, as this firm was not hired until after Plaintiff Shields had been served with that Answer and 
mterclaim. 
3 coming to Nielsen & Senior, Mr. Shields also incurred and paid a fee of 
$ 165. * legal consultation with an attorney at another firm whose advice Plaintiff Shields sought 
after receiving Defendant Santana's Answer and Counterclaim herein, as is evidenced by the receipt 
attached hereto. 
DATED this ^ ^ d ^ | ) 
Mangum ° 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t M s ^ d d a y of October, 1997. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CHERYL KONECNY 
60 E. 80. Itonpla, Ste. 1 too 
SUt Uke City. Utah 64111 
MywanvwstoncxpifQS 
July 14,2001 
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5.00 
NOTICE 
FROM 
AND 
HEARING scheduled on October 31, 
with Judge BURTON. 
MISCELLANEOUS FEE Payment Reversal 
Note: ENTERED AS CASH WAS A CHECK 
Fee Account created Total Due: 
MISCELLANEOUS FEE Payment Received 
Note: TAPE 
FILED: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM . 
FILED: NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR ARGUMENT AND DECISION AND 
HEARING ON ALL PENDING MOTIONS, AND AFF. ON ATTY. FEES 
JOHN K. MANGUM. 
ISSUED SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TIMES 3 
FILED: DEF'S MOTION TO DISM. PLA'S COMPLAINT W/O NOTICE; 
MEMO IN SUPPORT OF DEF'S MOTION TO DISM. PLA'S COMPLAINT. 
MKB/LJV (TAPE 97 592/CT 1510) PLAINTIFF PRESENT WITH 
JOHN K. MANGUM, COUNSEL. MARIA C.SANTANA REPRESENTING HERSELF 
COURT TAKES THE OPPORTUNITY TO APOLOGIZE TO MICHAEL V. SHIELDS 
CONCERNING HEARING THAT WAS SET ON OCT. 24, 1997 AND CONTINUED 
BEFORE COURT THAT DAY. BECAUSE MR. SHIELDS WAS PRESENT AND 
MADE STATEMENTS TO COURT, CASE IS TAINTED. (1660) MR. MANGUM 
OPPOSITION TO CHANGING JUDGES AND ANOTHER CONTINUANCE. 
(1710) COURT CLARIFIES. THERE WAS NO HEARING ON FRIDAY, CASE 
HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY CONTINUED. (1900) DEFT OBJECTION TO NEW 
MOTIONS FILED BY DEFT. THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED 6 WEEKS 
AGO. (1950)^ 
FEES 
ellens 
tamrav 
convert 
tamrav 
1951 
IF ISSUE1 
MR. SHIELDS STATEMENT. 
OF RENT CAN BE SOLVED 
HE WILL 
TODAY. 
FORGET ATTORNEY 
(2020) DEFT 
"OBJECTS AND REQUESTS JUDGE RECUSE HIMSELF.~ (2190) MR. MANGUM 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION. (2280) COURT RECUSES HIMSELF. THERE 
IS NO BASIS FOR A NEW TRIAL AS TO WHETHER DEFT SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN OUT OF APARTMENT. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DENIED. (2440) 
COURT ORDERS NO NEED FOR WRITEN ORDER. COURT ORDERED CASE 
ASSIGNED TO JUDGE FRATTO. 
COURT TO NOTIFY PARTIES OF NEW COURT DATE. 
FILED: PLA MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OPPOSING 
OF DEFT SANTANA TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
FILED: PLA SHIELDS COPY OF TRIAL NOTICE RETURNED FROM 
ellens 
OFellens 
ellens 
ellens 
kimm 
ellens 
ellens 
lindav 
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MOTIONvonamae 
vonamae 
2588 SO vonamae 
vonamae 
ISSUED TWO SUBPOENA'S TO MICHAEL SHIELDS, 
HOUSING ATHORATY OF SALT LAKE 
AND LINDA BAINES 
FILED: MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
FILED: AFF OF DEFT MARIA C SANTANA IN SUPPORT OF CONTINUANCE 
FILED: DEEFT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OPPOSING 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 
FILED: AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESS TODD KASTELER 
MAILED: NOTICE OF HEARINGS AND SCHEDULING ORDER 
1-5-98 @ 1:30 P.M. HEARING ON PLAINTIFF MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAvonamae 
1-12-09 DEADLINE FOR DISCOVERY CUTOFF vonamae 
1-20-98 ALL MOTIONS TO BE FILED BY THIS DATE vonamae 
1-22-98 @ 8:30 A.M. HARING ON ALL PENDING MOTIONS vonamae 
kimm 
kimm 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
vonamae 
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523 JUDICIAL CODE 78-36-10.5 
damages which may result to the defendant if the suit has 
been improperly instituted. The bond shall be payable to the 
clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs 
ind damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff*. The 
plaintiff shall notify the defendant that he has filed a posses-
sion bond. This notice shall be served in the same manner as 
service of summons and shall inform the defendant of all of the 
alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures 
applicable to an action if the|plaintiff)files a possession bond 
under Subsection (1): 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based 
solely upon nonpayment of rent or utilities, the existing 
contract shall remain in force and the complaint shall be 
dismissed if the defendant, within three days of the 
service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued 
rent, utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, includ-
ing attorney's fees, as provided in the rental agreement. 
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he 
executes and files a counter bond in the form of a 
corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property 
bond executed by two persons who own real property in 
the state and who are not parties to the action. The form 
of the bond is at the defendant's option. The bond shall be 
payable to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file 
the bond prior to the expiration of three days from the 
date he is served with notice of the filing of plainciff's 
possession bond. The court shall approve the bond in an 
amount that is the probable amount of costs of suit and 
actual damages that may result to the plaintiff if the 
defendant has improperly withheld possession. The court 
shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the 
defendant's total bond. 
f (c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a 
\ hearing to be held prior to the expiration of three days 
1 from the date the defendant is served with notice of the 
I filing of plaintiff's possession bond. 
13) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a 
remedy under Subsection (2) within the required time, the 
plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be granted an order of 
restitution. The constable of the precinct or the sheriff of the 
county where the property is situated shall return possession 
of the property to the plaintiff promptly. 
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection 
(2Kc), and if the court rules after the hearing that the plaintiff 
u entitled to possession of the property, the constable or 
iheriff shall promptly return possession of the property to the 
plaintiff. If at the hearing the court allows the defendant to 
remain in possession and further issues remain to be adjudi-
cated between the parties, the court shall require the defen-
dant to post a bond as required in Subsection (2Kb). If at the 
hearing the court rules that all issues between the parties can 
be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court 
shall, upon adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the 
ments. 1987 
78-36-9. Proof required of plaintiff — Defense. 
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or 
forcible detainer the plaintiff shall only be required to show, in 
addition to the forcible entry or forcible detainer complained 
of, that he was peaceably in the actual possession at the time 
of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the 
time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his 
defense that he or his ancestors, or those whose interest in 
tuch premises he claims, had been in the quiet possession 
thereof for the space of one whole year continuously next 
before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his 
interest therein is not then ended or determined; and such 
showing is a bar to the proceedings. 1953 
78-36-10. Judgment lor restitution, damages, and rent 
— Immediate enforcement — Treble damages. 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon 
default. A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall 
include an order for the restitution of the premises as provided 
in Section 78-36-10.5. If the proceeding is for unlawful de-
tainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or 
covenant of the lease or agreement under which the property 
is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment 
shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without 
a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the 
damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's ten-
ancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at 
trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful 
detainer is after default in the payment of rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as pro 
vided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for 
the rent, for three times the amount of the damages assessed 
under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and for reasonable 
attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agree-
ment. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in 
the payment of the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be 
issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all 
cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately. 
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7H "Mi 10.5. Order of restitution — Service — Enforce-
ment — Disposition of personal property — 
Hearing. 
{1) Each order of restitution shall: 
(a) direct the defendant to vacate the premises, remove 
his personal property, and restore possession of the pre-
mises to the plaintiff, or be forcibly removed by a sheriff or 
constable; and 
(b) advise the defendant of the time limit set by the 
court for the defendant to vacate the premises, which 
shall be three business days following service of the order, 
unless the court determines that a longer or shorter 
period is appropriate under the circumstances. 
12) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form for the 
defendant to request a hearing as listed on the form shall 
be served in accordance with Section 78-36-6 by a person 
authorized to serve process pursuant to Section 78-27-58. 
If personal service is impossible or impracticable, service 
may be made by: 
(i) mailing a copy of the order and tfie form to the 
defendant's last-known address and posting a copy of 
the order and the form at a conspicuous place on the 
premises; or 
(ii) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the 
commercial tenant defendant's last-known place of 
business and posting a copy of the order and the form 
at a conspicuous place on the business premises. 
(b) A request for hearing by the defendant may not stay 
enforcement of the restitution order unless: 
(i) the defendant furnishes a corporate bond, cash 
bond, certified funds, or a property bond to the clerk 
of the court in an amount approved by the court 
according to the formula set forth in Subsection 
78-36-8.5(2)(b); and 
(ii) the court orders that the restitution order be 
stayed. 
John K. Mangum, USB No. 2072 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plamtiff/Counterclaim Defendant Michael V. Shields 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL V. SHIELDS, ] 
Plaintiff (Owner), ) 
vs. ) 
MARIA SANTANA, ] 
Defendant (Renter). ] 
MARIA SANTANA, ] 
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
MICHAEL V. SHIELPS, DARLENE ] 
GREEN, KEVIN GREEN, individuals, ] 
JUANTTA INVESTMENT, a limited ] 
partnership and PARKSIDE ; 
APARTMENTS, a division of Juanita ; 
Investments, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
1 ORDER OF RESTITUTION OF PREMISES 
I Civil No. 970005271 
i Judge Michael Burton 
72373.SH374.003 
\<T r 
Pursuant to a hearing held on Monday, August 25, 1997 at 2:30 p.m., before the Honorable 
Michael Burton, pursuant to proper notice and request of Defendant Maria Cristina Santana for such 
hearing under section 78-36-8.5(2)(c) of the Utah Code, Plaintiff having previously posted a 
possession bond and Defendant Santana having failed to post any counter bond and having failed 
to pay accrued and unpaid rent, late fees, and filing costs and attorneys fees, at which hearing 
Plaintiff Michael V. Shields appeared in person and through his attorney John K. Mangum of 
Nielsen & Senior, and the Counterclaim Defendants having also appeared in person, and having 
determined, that it is appropriate to enter this Order of Restitution, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant Maria Cristina Santana is directed to vacate the premises she has been 
occupying at U n i t ^ o f the Parkside Apartments, 2588 South 900 East Salt Lake City, Utah, to 
remove only her personal property from said premises, and to promptly restore possession of those 
premises to Plaintiff Michael V: Shields within the time frame set forth below, or be forcibly 
removed by a Sheriff or a Constable; 
2. Defendant Maria Cristina Santana is hereby advised that the deadline for her to vacate 
the described premises, removejjer personal property therefrom, and restore possession thereof to 
Plaintiff is the ^ t r d a y of August, 1997, by no later than the hour of>_: p.m., or in the event that 
Defendant Santana is served this Order other than at the hearing described above, not later than 
9:00 p.m. three (3) business days following service of this Order, and 
3. Only in the event that Defendant Santana was not present at the hearing described 
above at which she had opportunity to address the terms of this Order, Defendant Maria Cristina 
Santana is advised of her right to contest the terms of this Order of Restitution or the manner of its 
72373.SH374.003 
enforcement if proper request for the same is made before the time set forth above for Defendant 
Maria Cristina Santana to take the action there specified A form for requesting such a hearing 
accompanies this Order in the event that Defendant has not already had the opportunity to address 
these matters at the hearing held August 25,1997. 
DATED this 7& day of August, 1997. 
72373.SH374.003 
John K. Mangum, USB No. 2072 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Michael V. Shields 
and for Juanita Investment and Parkside Apartments 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL V. SHIELDS, 
Plaintiff (Owner), 
vs. 
MARIA SANTANA, 
Defendant (Renter). 
MARIA SANTANA, 
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL V. SHIELDS, DARLENE 
GREEN, KEVIN GREEN, individuals, 
JUANITA INVESTMENT, a limited 
partnership and PARKSIDE 
APARTMENTS, a division of Juanita 
Investments, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF ON 
ACTION FOR UNPAID RENT AND 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
Civil No. 970005271 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
72374.SH374.003 
\<0 
Pursuant to a hearing held on Monday, September 21, 1998 at 10:30 a.m., before the 
Honorable Joseph Fratto, on proper advance notice, concerning Plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment, Plaintiff having previously been awarded an Order of Restitution of the subject premises 
earlier leased to Defendant Santana, and for good cause shown, the Court then finding no merit 
sufficient to withstand judgment for Plaintiff based on any of the affirmative defenses or the one 
remaining counterclaim of Defendant Santana against Plaintiff Shields, and 
Pursuant to a further hearing held on Monday, November 2, 1998 at 10:00 a.m., before the 
Honorable Joseph Fratto, on proper advance notice, concerning Defendant's objections to Plaintiffs 
proposed form of judgment previously served, after briefing from both Plaintiff and Defendant and 
review of the Affidavit of Michael V. Shields addressing damages, including court costs, which 
fulfills the requirements of the provisions of Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
the Affidavits of John K. Mangum on Attorneys Fees, at which hearing the issue of the proper 
amount of attorney fees and other damage items sought to be awarded to Plaintiff was adequately 
presented and argued, and for good cause shown, finding no merit sufficient to reduce the claims of 
Plaintiff for attorney fees and other elements of damages to any amount less than that shown below, 
now, therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. All counterclaims of Defendant Santana against Plaintiff Shields and against third-
party Defendants Juanita Investment and Parkside Apartments are hereby dismissed, with prejudice. 
2. Plaintiff Michael V. Shields is hereby granted summary judgment on his claim of 
unpaid rent and unlawful detainer against Defendant Maria Cristina Santana for her occupancy of 
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the premises located at Unit 36, Parkside Apartments, 2588 South 900 East Salt Lake City, Utah, 
from the 18th day of July, 1997, through the 6th day of September, 1997. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded judgment for unpaid rent in the sum of $ 48.87 for the period 
from the 18th day of July, 1997, through the 21st day of July, 1997. 
4. Plaintiff is awarded further damages for 47 days of unlawful detainer by Defendant 
Santana after the 21st day of July, 1997 through September 6,1997, at the rate of $16.6129 per day 
of unlawful detainer (based on a reasonable rental value of $515.00 per month for time the premises 
were occupied by Defendant Santana and withheld from the market during this period of unlawful 
detainer, divided by the 31 days per month in each of July and August of 1997), which unlawful 
detainer amounts are all to be trebled pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-36-10(3) of the Utah 
Code, less credits of $168.80 and $400.00 for amounts previously paid, leaving net trebled damages 
in the sum of $1,773.62, not including the prior unpaid rent of $48.87 specified above. 
5. Plaintiff is further awarded judgment against Defendant Maria Cristina Santana for 
$ 74.00 in filing fees and other costs of Court. 
6. Plaintiff is awarded prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of 10% per annum as 
specified in section 15-1-1(2) of the Utah Code for the period from July 22,1997, through the date 
of entry of this judgment, on only the unpaid rent of $ 48.87. Said prejudgment interest at the rate 
of $0.01339 per day for the 469 days through November 2,1998 is $6.28 , plus $0.01339 for each 
day thereafter until judgement is entered. 
7. Plaintiff, as the prevailing party both in prosecuting the claims of the Complaint and 
in defending against the affirmative defenses and counterclaims and other discovery and procedural 
filings of Defendant Santana in this action, is further awarded judgment against Defendant Maria 
72374.SH374.003 
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Cristina Santana for attorneys fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff to his attorneys at Nielsen & 
Senior for legal work actually performed by Nielsen & Senior through November 2,1998 in the sum 
of $ 31.465.29 . which work was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute this action to 
judgment and was billed at rates consistent with rates customarily charged in this community for 
similar services, all of which fees and costs are authorized pursuant to the provisions of section 10 
of the Uniform Residential Rental Agreement promulgated and approved by the Apartment 
Association of Utah which was signed and otherwise accepted and agreed to by Defendant Santana, 
and pursuant to section 78-36-10(3) of the Utah Code. 
8. Judgment in favor of Plaintiff for the total sum of $ 33.368.06 through November 2, 
1998, plus any later-accruiife j^fejtTdgment interest, shall all bear interest from and after the date that 
this judgment is entered at the rate of 7.468 % per annum as provided under the provisions of 
section 15-1-4 of the Utah Code, until all such sums are fully paid. 
9. As required under the provisions of Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, the social security number of Judgment Debtor Maria Cristina Santana, previously 
also known as Maria Cristina Martinez, is 266-59-1141 and her current or last known residential 
address is 44 West Broadway, Suite 304, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
10. And it is further ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise 
as shall be established by Affidavit. 
11. This judgment, now final between these parties named herein, shall be entered and 
may be enforced immediately and execution thereon shall be issued immediately after entry of this 
Judgment, pursuant to the provisions of section 78-36-10(4) of the Utah Code, and of Rule 54(b) of 
72374.SH374.003 
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as all claims and counterclaims between Plaintiff Shields and 
Defendant Santana, including the "counterclaims" of Defendant Santana against third-party 
Defendants Juanita Investment and Parkside Apartments, have now been fully resolved, there being 
no just reason for delay in entering this judgment, as all remaining "counterclaims" of Defendant 
Santana against third-parties Kevin and Darlene Green have npw.been resolved by settlement. 
DATED this Jg_ day of November, 1998. ^ / V o » 7 *••. v> 
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Maria Cristina Santana (7300) 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801)363-5803/485-5500 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL V. SHIELDS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARIA [CRISTINA] SANTANA, 
Defendant. 
MARIA CRISTINA SANTANA, 
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL V. SHIELDS, 
DARLENE GREEN, KEVIN GREEN, 
individuals; JUANTTA INVESTMENT 
a limited partnership, and PARKSJJDE 
APARTMENTS, a division of 
Juanita Investments. 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
JUDGMENT ON ACTION FOR 
UNPAID RENT, UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER AND AFFIDAVITS 
OF JOHN MANGUM AND 
MICHAEL SHIELDS 
Civil No. 97-000-5271 
Judge: Joseph Fratto 
Maria Cristina Santana objects to Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment on Action for 
Unpaid Rent, Unlawful Detainer and the Supporting Affidavits of John Mangum and 
Michael Shields, on the following grounds: 
MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Defendant Santana moved into Parkside Apartments and began paying rent 
on July 12, 1996. Seven weeks later on September 7, 1996, Darlene Green presented 
Defendant with the lease agreement. (Exhibit A) 
2. Darlene Green signed on behalf of the "owner," and Defendant signed on 
behalf of herself. (Exhibit A) Plaintiff Shields had no personal involvement in the 
signing of the lease and did not meet or speak to Defendant until one year later when the 
eviction controversy occurred. 
3. In July 1997, Defendant's rent was late, and Kevin Green served her a 3 
Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit. On July 28, 1997, Kevin Green represented to Pat 
Middleton and Defendant that Plaintiff "Mike" was unwillingly to accept rent because it 
was "too late" and "had decided 28 days was more consideration than they could stand." 
(Exhibit B, paragraphs 30, 43, 45) 
4. On July 28, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Eviction as a pro se 
litigant. (Exhibit C) On September 5, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Amount of 
Bond as a pro se litigant. (Exhibit D) 
5. On August 8, 1997, Defendant served her Answer and Counterclaim upon 
Plaintiff and Kevin and Darlene Green. The counterclaim does not request enforcement 
of any term of the lease agreement. (Exhibit E) 
6. On August 11, 1997, Defendant met Plaintiff Michael Shields for the first 
time when he approached her outside her apartment and waived the counterclaims at her. 
Plaintiff gave Defendant an ultimatum of paying the rent, dismissing her counterclaim 
and moving in exchange for not being evicted by the court. Defendant declined the 
threat. (Ses Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Objection to Judgment.) 
7. On August 12, 1997, Plaintiff, acting pro se, executed and served upon 
Defendant two contradictory documents: (1) A Notice of Bond including a "Notice of 
Tenant's Rights" containing notice that Defendant had the right to chose to pay the rent 
and have the complaint dismissed and be reinstated in the lease. (Exhibit F); and (2) A 
Notice of Non-Renewal stating that Defendant's lease would not be renewed. (Exhibit G) 
8. On August 24, 1997, a hearing on the eviction was held, and John 
Mangum made an appearance as counsel for Plaintiff who had acted pro se. No 
appearance of counsel had been filed prior to counsel's appearance in person at the 
hearing. 
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9. Judge Burton found Plaintiff was in unlawful detainer because rent had not 
been paid, but declined to reach any issues as to damages. (Exhibit H) 
10. On August 27, 1997, Judge Burton allowed Defendant to remain in the 
apartment until September 7, 1997 by paying rent for those additional days in the amount 
of $168.80. Defendant paid the amount. (Exhibit I) 
11. On October 24, 1997, Judge Burton granted continuance of a hearing due 
to Defendant's illness. The continuance provoked an angry exchange between Plaintiff 
and Judge Burton. In the process, Plaintiff made derogatory ex parte comments about 
Defendant. 
12. On October 29, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and 
Affidavit of Attorneys Fees From John Mangum requesting attorneys fees for the eviction 
and requesting no attorneys fees for the pending counterclaims. (Exhibit tylc) 
13. On October 31, 1997, the parties appeared before Judge Burton and 
Defendant was informed by the judge about the ex parte communication. Judge Burton 
stated that the case was tainted because of the nature of the comments made by Plaintiff. 
(Exhibit J4) 
14. Plaintiff requested Judge Burton nonetheless enter a judgment on unpaid 
rent and stated that he "will forget attorney fees if issue of rent can be solved today." 
(Exhibit ft) 
15. Judge Burton expressed his inclination to recuse himself unless Defendant 
had no objection. Defendant expressed her objection, and Judge Burton recused himself. 
(Exhibit p) 
16. The proposed judgment, in the form of John Mangum's Affidavit on 
Attorneys Fees, remained on file and was never again noticed up for hearing. On 
September 21, 1998, Plaintiff presented a new proposed judgment for the first time 
claiming that a term in the lease agreement allows recovery for attorneys fees incurred in 
defending against the counterclaims. (See Affidavit of Michael Shields) 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF WAS ON RECORD AS A PRO SE LITIGANT 
UNTIL AUGUST 25,1997 THEREBY PRECLUDING ATTORNEYS 
FEES PRIOR TO APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL, 
Plaintiff Shields undertook to represent himself "pro se" and filed the eviction 
Complaint, Motion to Set Bond, and Notice of Bond as a pro se litigant. (Exhibits C, D 
& F) Plaintiff now requests attorneys fees for work done "behind the scenes" by lawyers 
while he was on the record as a pro se litigant. The general rule is that "pro se litigants 
should not recover attorney fees for successful litigation." Smith v. Bachelor, 832 P.2d 
467, 473 (Utah 1991). No exception has been recognized for pro se litigants who claim 
to receive behind the scenes advice from counsel. 
It may be appropriate in some circumstances to award attorneys fees for work 
performed prior to commencement of an action where no one was on the record 
representing anyone. But in a case such as this, where Plaintiff was on the record pro se, 
the rule must apply. Finding otherwise opens the door for pro se litigants, particularly 
attorneys who regularly represent themselves, to circumvent the rule by claiming that 
legal assistance provided by associates qualifies although contrary to the rule's intent. 
Plaintiff maintained his pro se status until the afternoon of August 25, 1997 when 
John Mangum made an appearance on his behalf. Fees requested for work done by any 
lawyer, including preparation for the hearing, prior to the appearance by counsel at the 
hearing while Plaintiff was on the record pro se are unrecoverable. 
II. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES IN 
DEFENDING COUNTERCLAIMS BECAUSE THE LEASE TERM 
IS AMBIGUOUS AND CONTRARY TO THE PARTIES' INTENT. 
The rule pertaining to allocation of attorneys fees is that "a party is...entitled only 
to those fees resulting from its principal cause of action for which there is a contractual 
(or statutory) obligation for attorney fees." Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. 
Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981). Plaintiff Shields, however, argues that he is entitled to 
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attorneys fees for having to defend the counterclaims and cites an ambiguous term in the 
rental agreement that was signed without meaningful choice almost two months after 
moving into the apartment. (See Defendant's Affidavit Supporting Objection to Proposed 
Judgment.) 
"If legal action is taken by either party to enforce this Agreement, 
or to enforce any rights arising out of breach of this Agreement or to 
evict,...,the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs incurred in 
connection with such action, including a reasonable attorney's fee and 
collection costs, with or without suit.1' (Exhibit A & D) 
A. Ambiguity is construed against the drqfter/lessor: 
Reasonable analysis of the term leads to the conclusion that several interpretations 
are possible. What does, "If legal action is taken...with or without suit" mean? Does 
"taken" narrowly mean commencing legal action, or does it broadly include defending 
against legal action? Does it include counterclaims that do not initiate a law suit but 
simply expand the parameters of the controversy? Does the term clearly and 
unambiguous include countersuits filed in response to a complaint? If the term "if legal 
action is taken11 means "if legal action is initiated" then attorneys fees are not included for 
counterclaims. If the term means, "if you respond by countersuit to legal action" then 
attorneys fees for counterclaims would be included. 
What does, "to enforce rights arising out of breach the agreement" mean? Does it 
narrowly mean causes of action pertaining to contract breach or does it broadly include 
causes of action such as negligence that do not depend on the rental agreement? If the 
counterclaims never mention the rental agreement, and never mention a right arising out 
of any breach of the rental agreement, as is the case in Defendant's counterclaims, how 
can they be included? If the court dismisses counterclaims by finding the defendant has 
no actionable rights, are those precluded from an award of attorneys fees because they 
were never "rights11 that could arise "out of breach of the agreement?" 
5 
How can legal action be taken "with or without suit?" Does a demand letter 
stating a claim constitute legal action without suit and give rise to attorneys fees if the 
landlord consults a lawyer and denies the claim? How does a party "prevail" "without 
suit" when there is no decision maker to decide who prevails? If the landlord consults an 
attorney prior to serving a three day notice to pay rent, is the tenant liable for attorneys 
fees in addition to rent? If the tenant received the three day notice to pay rent on the 3rd 
day of the month, would he be in breach on the 5th for paying rent but refusing to pay 
attorneys fees incurred in Plaintiffs consultation with counsel? 
Obviously, the term is ambiguous because it can be reasonably interpreted in 
several different ways. "Contract language is considered ambiguous if the words used to 
express the meaning and intention of the parties are 'insufficient' in a sense that the 
contract may be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings." Crowther v. 
Carter, 767 P.2d 129 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Court must construe the ambiguous terms in favor of Defendant who does not 
believe the term is broad enough to encompass, and did not contemplate, paying attorneys 
fees for counterclaims she might bring on an action for eviction. "Any ambiguity in a 
lease shall be construed against the lessor" Edwards & Daniels Architects, 865 P.2d 1382 
(Utah App. 1993) citing Stevensen v. Bird, 636 P.2d 1029, 1031, Powerine Co. v. RuselVs 
Inc., 103 135 P.2d 906, 913 (Utah 1943). "In choosing among the reasonable meanings 
of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which 
operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise 
proceeds." Restatement Second of Contracts 206 (1981) as quoted in Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996). "Interpretation 
of a contract is a matter of law if based upon the wording of the contract. If the contract 
is incomplete or ambiguous, interpretation of the contract is a question of fact, based 
upon the intention of the parties as shown by extrinsic evidence." Kimball v. Campbell, 
669 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
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ft The intent of the parties did not include counterclaims; 
The fact that the lease was signed September 7, 1997 despite living in the 
apartment since July 12, 1997 supports that Defendant's intention in signing was simply 
to not be forced out after incurring the time and monetary expense of moving into the 
apartment almost two months prior to being presented the lease. The facts simply do not 
give rise to the inference that any meaningful bargaining could have taken place or that 
Defendant intended to agree to liability for attorneys fees should she countersue on an 
eviction. More importantly, Plaintiff has never discussed the terms of the lease with 
Defendant, did not meet Defendant until almost a year later, and cannot testify as to her 
intent when she signed because it was Darlene Green who presented the lease to 
Defendant and signed on behalf of Plaintiff as an agent of the owner. As a result, 
Plaintiff cannot offer any basis for an argument that the terms of the lease were the intent 
of the parties.. 
The lease is an adhesion contract because it was "prepared in a standardized form 
and presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to one occupying a disadvantaged bargaining 
position." System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). Courts have long 
refused to enforce contract terms arising from this sort of procedural unconscionability. 
Resource Management Co., v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985); Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
Defendant certainly never intended that counterclaims be covered under the term. 
As the court looks to the intent of the parties, Plaintiff Shields1 own actions further 
support that the term was not understood or intended as entitling him to attorneys fees for 
defending the counterclaims: 1) Plaintiff filed a proposed judgment and Affidavit of 
Attorneys Fees on October 29, 1997, before the counterclaims were tried, as though he. 
believed he was entitled to attorneys fees only for the eviction and not the pending 
counterclaims. (Exhibit J & K) Unfortunately for Plaintiff, on October 31, 1997, the day 
he sought the judgment Judge Burton informed him that he was recusing himself because 
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of the nature of the ex parte communications they had and would not consider the issue. 
2) Plaintiff responded to Judge Burton by making a statement in open court, recorded on 
the docket, that "he will forget attorney fees if the issue of rent can be solved today." 
(Exhibit L) The statement was an appeal to Judge Burton to enter judgment on the rent 
despite the Judge's inclination to recuse himself. 
Certainly, Plaintiff would not have made such an appeal had he believed that he 
would be entitled to additional attorneys fees in defending the remaining counterclaims 
which had not been tried. Moreover, Defendant would have accepted entry of a judgment 
on those terms rather than risk the potential of additional attorneys fees in the future on 
the pending counterclaims. The fact is that attorneys fees for counterclaims was never 
intended or considered by either party. 
Since making that statement, however, Plaintiff apparently reconsidered the lease 
term and decided not to notice the proposed judgment for decision, despite it being filed 
almost a year ago, so that he might request attorneys fees on the counterclaims as well. 
That first proposed judgment and affidavit of attorneys fees of October 1997 never 
mentioned the lease term on attorneys fees that is now at issue. It is reasonable to infer 
from these facts that with the passage of time, the new meaning evolved to include 
attorneys fees for defending counterclaims, not from the intent of the parties but from 
careful study of the term by legal counsel. 
Defendant interprets the term to mean, the same as Plaintiff originally believed, 
that if one party initiates a legal action and does not prevail, it is liable for attorneys fees 
incurred in defending the action. Consistent with Plaintiffs original interpretation, 
Defendant does not believe that filing counterclaims, which by their very nature are 
counter-responses to a complaint, fall within the meaning of "if legal action is taken" and 
did not intend to agree to those terms. Defendant further believes that "rights arising out 
of breach o/the agreement" presupposes causes of action directly alleging a breach of 
some term within the four corners of the writing and excludes any other causes of action. 
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HI. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PRECLUDES PLAINTIFF FROM 
RECOVERING TREBLE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
BECAUSE HE GAVE NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO REINSTATEMENT UNDER U.C.A. 78-
36-8.5(2)(a). 
Plaintiff Shields seeks to benefit from U.C.A. 78-36-1 et seq. In actions for 
unlawful detainer, however, "statutes provide severe remedy and must be strictly 
complied with before cause of action thereon may be maintained." Van Zyverden v. 
Farrar, 393 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1964). Judge Burton declined to reach the issue of 
damages and simply found that possession rightly belonged to Plaintiff because 
Defendant had not paid the rent due. (Exhibit H) While Plaintiff was entitled to 
possession, he is not entitled to treble damages or attorneys fees under the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel because he did not comply with provisions of the statute, and acted to 
prevent Defendant from being reinstated in the lease. 
"(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to 
an action if the plaintiff files a possession bond under Subsection (1): 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon 
nonpayment of rent or utilities, the existing contract shall remain in force 
and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within three days 
of the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, 
utility charges, any late fees, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as 
provided in the rental agreement." U.C.A. 78-36-8.5(2)(a). (Exhibit M) 
On July 28, 1997, Plaintiff told Kevin Green, who conveyed the message to 
Defendant, not to accept rent payment because it was "too late" to prevent eviction. On 
August 11, 1997, Plaintiff gave Defendant the ultimatum of paying rent, dismissing her 
counterclaims and moving to avoid being thrown out by the court. On August 12, 1997, 
Plaintiff executed the Notice of Bond together with the Notice of Rights of Tenants which 
notified Defendant she had the right to do exactly what Plaintiff had been denying—the 
right to pay the rent and stay in the apartment. (Exhibit F) By no coincidence on that 
same day, in what appeared a deliberate attempt to preempt the three days to pay and be 
9 
reinstated, Plaintiff served a Notice of Non Renewal stating that Defendant's lease would 
be terminated and she must move within 18 days. (Exhibit G) 
Defendant's lease does not allow for termination upon 18 days notice but requires 
30 days notice. "If the tenancy reverts to a month to month tenancy, written notice of 
termination must be given by either party at least 30 days before the end of the month" 
(Exhibit A) Defendant reasonably interpreted the Notice of Non Renewal served on the 
same day as a device by Plaintiff to circumvent Defendant's right to elect reinstatement. 
In a case analogous to this one, Monter v. Kratzers Speciality Bread Co., the Court held, 
"The landlord cannot prevent the tenant from paying the judgment and regaining his 
rights under the unexpired lease by the device of failing to have the amount of rent due 
included in the judgment." 504 P.2d 40, 42, (Utah 1972). At the time Plaintiff served the 
Notice of Tenant's Rights, the amount owed was minimal as Plaintiff was acting pro se 
and the unpaid rent amounted to less than one month. 
Plaintiffs actions concerning the Notice of Non Renewal occurred after the 
Answer was filed, but Defendant had already raised the issue of estoppel in her Answer & 
Counterclaim based on Plaintiffs refusal to accept rent. (Exhibit E) 
"[Equitable estoppel requires] three essential core elements: 1) a 
party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act that is inconsistent with a 
latter asserted claim; 2) reasonable action or inaction by a second party, 
taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act; 3) injury to the second party resulting from allowing the first party to 
repudiate it's statement, admission, act, or failure to act." Mendez v. State 
of Utah 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991); Ceco Corp. v. Concrete 
Specialists, 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989) 
Plaintiff expressed to Kevin Green and Defendant, both verbally, and implicitly 
by serving Notice of Non Renewal, that he would not reinstate Defendant even if she paid 
rent. Defendant was sufficiently clear on Plaintiffs intent not to allow her to stay no 
matter what she did. Defendant reasonably relied upon Plaintiffs representations and 
elected the alternative remedy of requesting a hearing rather than risk that payment of rent 
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would nonetheless result in another action for eviction pursuant to the Notice of Non 
Renewal. Plaintiff now seeks to repudiate his actions in blocking Defendant's right to pay 
and be reinstated. Defendant will suffer injury if Plaintiff is allowed to repudiate his 
actions and recover treble damages and attorneys fees under the statute when he made 
clear his intent to obtain the statute's benefits but block Defendant's rights under the same 
statute. 
Plaintiffs representation that Defendant's right to pay and be reinstated could be 
nullified by the Notice of Non Renewal need not be intentional for equitable estoppel to 
apply. "Negligent false representation is sufficient to invoke equitable estoppel." 
Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah 1985) ""Equitable estoppel...is a 
doctrine of Equity to prevent one party from deluding or inducing another into a position 
where he will unjustly suffer loss." J.P. Koch, Inc., J.C Penny Co., Inc. (Utah 1975). A 
trial court's finding that equitable estoppel is inapplicable is reviewed for correctness. 
Holland v. Career Services, 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993) In contrast, the 
appellate court "will not overturn application of equitable estoppel absent abuse of 
discretion." State of Utah v. Irizarry, 893 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah App. 1995) 
IV. PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES IS SO 
UNREASONABLE IT BEARS NO RELATIONSHIP TO A 
RECOVERABLE AMOUNT. 
A* Reasonable fees. 
Plaintiff Shields has requested this Court altruistically award him $28,031.92 plus 
pre-judgment interest on a complaint alleging $215 in unpaid rent. In other words, he 
seeks 135 times the original amount owed, and includes in the fees such frivolous matters 
as time spent a) consulting "State Farm" about insurance coverage under his policy, and 
updating the insurance company on case developments; b) lawyers working behind the 
scenes while Plaintiff was on the record as a "pro seff litigant; c) interviewing Defendant's 
former classmates and clients; d) reviewing Defendant's bankruptcy pleadings and name 
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change; e) researching and drafting restraining orders and affidavits that Judge Burton 
refused to hear in August 1997; f) investigating an individual who was mistakenly 
assumed to be Defendant and preparing the false allegation that Defendant had been 
convicted of assault; g) re-investigating the false allegation once Defendant demonstrated 
the allegation was false and the person targeted in their investigation was not Defendant; 
h) preparing and attending a hearing wherein Judge Burton recused himself because of 
Plaintiffs actions in October 1997; i) drafting the former proposed judgment, $40 in faxes 
associated with that pleading, which Judge Burton refused to hear because of the ex parte 
communication that occurred days earlier; j) work generated and/or scrapped because of 
Judge Burton's recusal, and numerous other similar charges. (See Affidavit of John 
Mangum) 
A more blatant disregard for "reasonableness" can scarcely be imagined. The 
number of charges and fees requested by Plaintiff that are not reasonably related to the 
eviction, work that was wasteful and irrelevant, is infinitesimal. Plaintiff fails to allocate 
which fees are recoverable and requests the Court award an amount no court could award 
on a $215 eviction without abusing discretion. A party who fails to allocate attorney fees 
between those which are recoverable, and those which are not, may forfeit the award 
entirely, at the trial court's discretion. Utah Farm Production at 66; Selvage v. JJ. 
Johnson Assoc, 910 P.2d 1252, 1266 (Utah App. 1996). 
A Prejudgment interest 
As previously noted, Plaintiff filed a proposed judgment once the eviction process 
was concluded on September 7, 1997 and sought a decision in October 1997. The 
unlawful detainer statute allows judgment to be entered prior to the conclusion of any 
counterclaims. "In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately." 
U.C.A. 78-36-10(4). (Exhibit M) Three things precluded entry of judgment on the 
eviction in October 1997 and all were within Plaintiffs control. 1) Plaintiffs ex parte 
communication resulted in Judge Burton's recusal, and he declined to decide the issue; 2) 
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The recusal derailed the case from normal course; and 3) Plaintiff decided to postpone 
judgment on the eviction for more than a year. 
This Court should not penalize Defendant by awarding prejudgment interest when 
Plaintiff had a proposed judgment on file and deliberately postponed the issue at his 
leisure for more than a year after eviction. Should this Court be inclined to award any 
attorneys fees, Defendant requests an evidentiary hearing and that Plaintiff demonstrate 
why those charges and others are recoverable. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff cannot recover attorneys fees while he 
was on the record as a pro se litigant. Plaintiff cannot recover attorneys fees arising from 
defense of the counterclaims because neither party intended the lease's ambiguous term 
on attorneys fees to apply to counterclaims, and the ambiguity must be construed against 
the drafter. Remaining attorneys fees and treble damages pursuant to U.C.A. 78-36-1 et 
seq are precluded by estoppel because Plaintiff should not benefit from the statute when 
he failed to strictly comply with its terms by notifying Defendant via a "Notice of Non-
Renewal," served simultaneously with the Notice of Right to Reinstatement, that he 
would circumvent her right to be reinstated. Prejudgment interest would be inequitable 
and should not be awarded because a proposed judgment was filed and judgment would 
have been entered in October 1997 but for Plaintiffs actions resulting in Judge Burton's 
recusal; and Plaintiffs subsequent decision to postpone entry of the judgment for a year 
after eviction. 
The most this Court should award Plaintiff is unpaid rent that Defendant has never 
refused to pay. Defendant paid $168.00 for rent from August 28th to September 7, 1997 
to remain an extra ten days per Judge Burton's order. The remaining unpaid rent includes 
the $215 alleged in the complaint for July; and $464.36 not paid in August, together with 
a $37.00 court filing fee. From that total of $716.36, Defendant should be credited her 
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$400 security deposit, which Plaintiff admits in his affidavit should be credited to her, 
bringing the amount owed to $316.36. 
Respectfully submitted this^Q day of September 19S 
Maria Cristina Santana 
Defendant/ Counterclaim Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this2J day of September, 1998, I caused to be served, by 
US Mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon.' 
John Mangum 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David Mortensen 
PO Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Darlene and Kevin Green 
10765 Old Highway 54 
Holts SvffiMttit, Mo 65043 
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4. 
Apartmant Aaaoclallon of Utah 
UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL RENTAL AGREEMENT 
RECEIVED FROM CiAJt a ) ma.) _, lessee, hereinafter 
referred to as ResldenUhe slim of $ DOLLARS evidenced by 
Q Cash. Q Check J^^Other, as a deposit which, upon acceptance of this rental agreement, shall belong to the Lessor of the premises, hereinafter 
referred to as Owner, and shall be applied as follows: 
Rent for the period from. 
(Pro-rate to end of month) yv IX- 3/ If?6 month's rent $ sis-
Refundable Portion $ 400-
Other 
(specify, i.e., Pet, etc.) 
Refundable Portion $ _ 
./?t.#7L£' 
Security Deposit $ £}00» 
_ Non Refundable Portion $ / ftO ' 
Payable Prior 
to Occupancy 
340* s — 
» SISfr 
-fr- -6- dS=. 
-&- _ Non Refundable Portion $ J ^ 
If this agreement is not accepted by the Owner or his agent, wj$ 
rent from the Owner the premises situated in the City of* 
State of /\\JfxJL^K-<* ^ _ .located a 
Uhln _ £-
TOTAL: 
days, the total deposit received st^ all be, refunded. Resident agrees to 
_ County of 
7 ^ l t  t XlJTl nSc & fOO/T _ Apt. No. 2&- consisting of 
_ upon the following TERMS and CONDITIONS. 
(description of unit, l.av '2 bedroom, 1 bath and g) 
TERM OF AGREEMENT: The term of this agreement shall commence on £(./-(_& * / 
" oni 
is given by either party at least thirty (30) days before thread of fits Initial lease term. If the tenancy reverts to a month to month tenancy, written 
unless terminated sooner as herein provided. This agreemenj 
/notice ot lerminationViusi beaiven by either party at 
^ l E N T : Rent shall be $ 0 -A«5x_ per month, payabli 
the following address . 
le date flog 
illjf^ renew 
j terr 
ie.endol tt 
I Zt 
- 1 9 ^ . 
~ ^ ~ — . ^ ^Hiut,WJ0t^S9r 
Jautomatlcalljf^ tenew on a month-to-month basis unless written nopbe of termination 
and end ol 
iast 30 days bejore th  [the month 
> in advance upon the / ^ / T day of each calendar month to Owner or his authorized agent, at 
If rent is not paid within five (5) days after du , Resident agrees to pay a late charge of $20.00. In the event of a dishonored rent check, Resident 
agrees to, within twenty-four (24) hours of a dishonor, replace said check with certified funds and pay a $15.00 dishonored check fee. If check is 
dishonored, the Owner may require Renter to make all future payments with cash or cashier's check, and Owner will provide receipt for all such 
payments. 
SECURITY DEPOSIT: The Security Deposit set forth above shall secure the performance of Resident's obligations. Refund of Security Deposit is depen-
CN/dent upon Resident fulfilling ALL of the following conditions: 
y \ 1. Resident has provided a written thirty (30) day notice to Owner prior to the date of termination or expiration. 
2. Resident has no other monies due. 
3. Resident has thoroughly cleaned the premises, appliances, and fixtures. The Owner will deduct from the security deposit all reasonable 
charges to accomplish cleaning or repair from damage over normal wear and tear. 
4. All individuals using or occupying the premises have surrendered the premises to Owner, and all keys to the premises, mailbox or storage 
rooms are turned in to the Owner. 
5. Resident supplies the Owner with a forwarding address, in writing, in order to send security deposit. 
RESIDENT SHALL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPLY SECURITY DEPOSIT IN PAYMENT OF LAST MONTH'S RENT. 
MULTIPLE OCCUPANCY: It is expressly understood that this agreement is between the Owner and all signatories, jointly and severally. In the event of 
default each and every signatory shall be responsible for timely payment of rent and all other provisions of this agreement. 
,jZJEI< UTILITIES: Resident Shall be responsible for the following utilities and services: D Water, D Sewer,/] Gas.jZf Electricity, p Othei 
USE: The premises shall be used as a residence by the undersigned adults and ~ ^ " ~ children, and for no other purpose without the prior written 
consent of the Owner. Occupancy by guests staying over 7 days will be considered to be in violation of this provision unless prior written consent is 
given by the Owner. 
INVENTORY: The following furnishings and inventory are part of this agreement. \.C&LkurCA. lUj CldA $d4g/G&\dlJl&i&(£J 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS (•#» reverse tide lor additional terms and conditions): _ 
-O. 
ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This form constitutes the entire agreement made between the parties and may be modified only by a writing signed by both 
parties. The following exhibits, if any, have been made a part of this agreement: l 
, 0Pe l ^Application to Rent Ja Inspection List p House Rules  Pet Lease 
I 
Pj/ffi&l.'tAiistiJi.Adh 
3Z-.H02 
The undersigned Owner accepts this agreement, has read and does The undersigned Resident acknowledges receipt of a copy hereof; 
hereby agree to abide by the house rules. accepts this agreement, and~has read and does hereby agree to abide by 
. . ' j l / house /ul*s. S~\A ( J 
Owner or Agent Resident 
V ? - " V 2 _ Snofal RpriirMv Mn 
\ «1.l/ 
2. HOUSE RULES: Resident, guests and other occupants agree to abi Je by all house rules which are attached and are hereby made a part of this agree-
ment, Including but not limited to rules with respect to noise, odors, disposal of refuse, pets, parking, and use of common areas. Resident understands 
that all guests and occupants are bound by this agreement. 
3. ORDINANCES AND STATUTES: Resident shall comply with all laws, health codes, and regulations of all municipal, state and federal authorities. 
4. ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETTING: Resident shall not assign this agreement or sublet any portion of the premises without prior written consent of the 
Owner. 
5. MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS OR ALTERATIONS: Resident accepts the premises as being in good order and repair, unless otherwise indicated in 
writing. Resident shall, at his own expense, maintain the premises in a clean and sanitary manner, including all equipment, appliances, furniture and 
furnishings therein, and shall surrender the same, at termination, in as good condition as received, normal wear and tear excepted Resident shall be 
responsible for all repairs required for damages caused by his negligence and that of his guests, or other occupants Resident shall not paint, or other 
wise redecorate or make alterations to the premises without the prior written consent of the Owner. Resident will not remove Owners fixtures, furniture 
and/or furnishings from the .apartment, for any purpose. When Resident mpves in, Owner shall lurnish light bulbs QI prescribed watlage for apartments' 
sockets, thereafter, light bulbs will be replaced at Resident's expense. 
. . . . :«: 
6. ENTRY AND INSPECTION: Resident shall permit Owner or Owner's agents to enter the premises al reasonable times and upon reasonable notice for 
the purpose of inspecting the premises or.showing the same to prospective Residents or purchasers or for making necessary repairs In case of 
emergency no notice need be given. 
7. POSSESSION: If Owner is unable to deliver possession of the premises as agreed, Owner shall not be liable for any damage caused. Resident may 
terminate.this agreement if possession is not delivered as agreed above. 
8. TRANSFER: Resident shall be released from the obligations of this lease if Resident receives a job transfer of 25 miles or more and furnishes owner 
with the following: (a) Provides a certified copy of military transfer orders or a statement in the form of an affidavit sworn to before a notary public from 
employer evidencing such transfer, (b) 30 day written notice of termination, (c) All rents and charges paid through the date of termination 
9. EARLY TERMINATION: If for any reason other than those set forth in paragraph 8 abpve, you desire to terminate the Lease at any time after the first 
120 days of the term but prior to the end of sai'd term, the following Is required (a) 30 days written notice of termination (b) All rents and charges paid 
through the date of termination, (c) Payment of an amount equal to one and one half months rent as a termination fee (d) Premises shall be in good 
clean condition with no damage, ordinary wear & tear excepted (e) Comply with all other applicable terms and conditions of this lease. 
10. ATTORNEY'S FEES: If legal action is taken by either party to enforce this agreement, or to enforce any rights arising out of the breach of this 
agreement or to evict Resident, guests, or other occupants, the prevailing party shall be entitled to all costs incurred in connection with such action, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee and collection costs, with or without suit 
11. WAIVER; No tailuie-ol Owner to enforce any part of this agreement shall be deemed as a waiver, nor shall any acceptance of a partial payment of rent 
be deemed a waiver of Owner's right to full amount. 
12. NOTICES: All notices shall be given in accordance with state Iaw6. Where requirements are not spelled out by law, notice may be given by mailing 
the same, postage prepaid, to Resident at the premises or to Owner -at the address shown below or at such other places as may be designated 
13. REIMBURSEMENT BY RESIDENT: Resident agrees to reimburse Owner promptly for-the replacement cost ol any los6, property damage, or cost of 
repairs or service (including plumbing trouble) caused by negligence or improper use by Resident, his agents, lamily or guests Resident shall be 
responsible for damage from windows or doors left open. Such reimbursement is due when Owner makes demand. Owner's failure to demand damage 
reimbursements, late-payment charges, returned check charges or other sums due by Resident, shall not be deemed a waiver and Owner may demand 
same at any time, including after move-out. 
14. OWNER SHALL NOT BE LIABLE: Owner shall not be liable for any damages or losses to person or property caused by other residents or other 
persons. Owner shall not be liable for personal injury or damage or loss of Resident's personal properly (furniture, jewelry, clothing, etc.) from theft, 
vandalism, fire, water, rain, hail, smoke, explosions, sonic booms or other causes whatsoever, unless the same is due to the negligence of Owner 
Owner strongly recommends that Resident secure insurance to protect himself against the above occurrences. Owner or his agents will not render any 
services such as moving automobiles, handling of furniture, cleaning, delivering packages, or any other service not contemplated in this contract 
15. REPAIRS AND MALFUNCTIONS: RESIDENT AGREES TO REQUEST ALL REPAIRS ANO SERVICES IN WRITING TO MANAGER, except in extreme 
emergency when telephone calls will be accepted, in case of malfunction o( equipment or utilities, or damage by fire, water, or other cause, Resident 
shall notify Manager immediately, and Owner shall act with due diligence in making repairs and RENT SHALL NOT ABATE DURING SUCH PERIOD If 
the damaged premises are unfit for occupancy, Owner shall within reasonable time in writing inform Resident whether he intends to terminate the 
contract or repair said premises, if Owner elects to repair the premises, said repairs shall be undertaken with due diligence If terminated, rent will be 
prorated and the balance refunded along with the deposit(s), less lawful deductions. 
16. DEFAULT BY OWNER: Owner agrees to (a) keep all areas of the property in a reasonably clean condition; (b) properly maintain water, heating, 
plumbing, electrical service and/or air conditioning equipment, if provided, (c) abide by applicable state and local laws regarding repair; (d) make 
reasonable repairs, subject to Resident's obligation to pay for damages caused by Resident, or other occupants 
17. DEFAULT BY RESIDENT: Owner may, upon written notice, terminate Resident's right to occupancy if anv of the following conditions occur: 
1. Resident fails to pay rent or other lawful charges when due 
2. Resident fails to reimburse Owner for damages, repairs or plumbing service costs when due. 
3r- Resident^ guests or other occupants violate this contract, Owner's rules and regulations, or applicable state and local laws. 
4. Resident abandons the apartment. 
5. Resident, guests, or other occupants threaten or assault or use abusive or offensive language against other resident, or any agent, employee, 
or representative of Owner. 
18. RENT INCREASE CLAUSE: Due to increase in utilities, taxes, insurance, and other operating expenses. Owner may increase the monthly rental in 
lease upon 30 days written notice to resident. In no-event may the rent be increased more than 10% during the initial term of the lease 
19. ABANDONMENT: Abandonment shall have occurred if, (1) without notifying the Owner. Resident is absent from the premises for 15 days while rent 
is due and Resident's possessions remain in the apartment, or (2) without notifying the Owner, Resident is absent for 1 day while rent is due and 
Resident's possessions have been removed from the apartment. If Resident abandons apartment, Owner may ie take apartment and attempt to rent it 
at fair market value. Resident shall be liable for the entire rent due for the remainder of the term, or the cosi ol ierenting the apartment, including rent 
lost, the cost of restoring the apartment to the condition at the lime it was rented, and reasonable lues to« re renting the apartment. II Resident has lelt 
personal property in the apartment, Owner may remove it and store it and attempt to give Residant notice of this action Resident may obtain property 
by paying moving and storage costs. If Resident fails to claim property within 30 days of notice, Ownei may make a reasonable effort to sell the property 
at its fair market value and apply the proceeds toward any amount the Resident may owe Any money remaining alter such action shall be disposed of in 
accordance with UCA-78 44-11. 
20. TIME: Time is of the essence for this agreement. 
X'* 
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The following pages are the responses and supporting documents from 
Kevin and Darlene Green to the counterclaim made by: Maria Cristina 
Santana 
In Case No. 97005271 Judge Micheal Burton 
Maria Cristina Santana 
Vs. 
Michael V. Sheilds, Kevin Green, and Darlene Green, Juanita Investment, and Parkside 
Apartments. 
Case No. 970005271 
22 '97 11: 
Tie followir 
levin and E 
iantana 
Maria Cristin 
vlichael V. SI 
apartments. 
Judge: Michael Burton 
ANSWER TO SANTANA'S COUNTERCLAIM 
1. Santana received the required paperwork a few days late because she was in such a hurry 
to move in. Santana did in fact sign all the papers, however, they were later discovered to 
be missing. Another copy was provided to Santana which she claimed she lost A third 
copy was delivered to her which she signed and returned. 
2. The practice at Parkside was that the manager would work things out with tenants 
Santana never gave any indication she had a valid reason to speak with Mike Shields. If 
Santana had a serious enough complaint, she could have gone to the Housing Association 
or the Better Business Bureau to contact Mike Shields. It is a ridiculous claim that 
Darlene said she had all decision making power, or that ownership of Parkside hinged on 
her being there. 
3. Business mail for Parkside Apartments arrived at this address Parkside Apartments is a 
business address for Mike Shields and not claimed as his residence. 
4. In January 1997, Darlene asked Santana if she knew of an attorney her daughter Pat 
Middleton could speak with about her child custody case. Santana asked Darlene to have 
Pat come and see her so they could discuss the case. Santana is lying when she claims 
Darlene offered to "take care of the rent" in exchange for legal work. Darlene never 
represented herself to Santana as anything other than a parent seeking information that 
would help her daughter where the custody case was concerned. Darlene never claimed to 
anyone at any time that she could do as she pleased at Parkside. 
5. In February 1 Q97uPitt M ^ l f u * and Santana met in Santana's apartment to discuss Pat's 
case. Pat had no money to pay an attorney and Darlene had no money to lend to Pat for 
an attorney. Santana agreed to take Pat's case "pro bono" and that was all Darlene or 
Kevin Green were told about the agreement between Santana and Pat Middleton. Darlene 
never agreed to enter into a 'Tee Agreement" with Pat or Santana. Such a fee agreement 
would have been stupid as Pat had already found several attorneys who would take the 
case for $2,000.00 up front. 
6. At no time ever was $150. 00 in cash, or any other amount of money given to Santana by 
Darlene or Kevin Green. On two occasions, Pat and Dave Middleton borrowed $ 150.00 
from Kevin Green claiming they were behind on their car payment and other bills. 
7. During the seven (7) months mentioned here, there were several court appearances but 
there were no billable hours" as the only agreement we were told of was a <4pro bono'* 
contract between Pat Middleton and Santana. During theses months all discussions with 
Darlene of Pat's child custody case were at the request of Santana or Pat. 
A 
> # 
8. After several complaints from Santana* s neighbors that Santana was harassing them about 
noise, we finally learned that Santana was conduction her law practice from her apartment. 
Santana was immediately reminded that per her lease agreement no "business" could be 
run from her apartment. Santana soon informed Darlene that she had joined a Law Firm 
\ and would not conduct her law practice from her apartment any longer. In July 1997, 
\ Santana put a sign on her door which we understood was intended to keep salesmen away. 
9. No "check from California" has been expected by Kevin or Darlene Green . Santana's 
knowledge of Darlene's personal injury suit comes from Pat Middleton who only know&___ 
that the suitJsj)rocceding. No settlement from that suit has even been expected this 
calendar year Santana paid her own rent because she never had any expectations of 
payment from Pat Middleton or Darlene and Kevin Green. 
10. (Several errors here) It was the winter of 96, not 97, and the topic of the program did not 
include a discussion of a conviction for rape as Kevin was not even tried for rape, let alone 
convicted. Kevin has been declared "factually innocent of all charges and allegations*', and 
was released from prison on June 20, 1996. Santana was provided this information in 
connection with Pat Middleton1 s custody case because it was thought that Pat's ex-
husband would try to use Kevin's past to confuse the court on the custody issue of Pat's 
kids. Prior to the airing of the Maury Povich show there was already very little contact 
between Kevin and Santana, but Santana actually increased that contact after the show 
was aired by agreeing to take Pat Middleton's custody case. 
11. Santana had never informed Pat Middleton or Darlene Green that she did not wish to 
discuss Pat's case on certain days of the week. Pat had called Santana several times over 
several days and could get no response from Santana. Pat called Darlene to asked if 
Darlene could contact Santana. Pat was concerned because Santana was not returning her 
calls and feared that Santana may have quit on her. Darlene also called Santana several 
times and was unable to get a response from her. This was unusual behavior from Santana 
to date. 
12. As a result of Pat and Darlene not being able to reach Santana by phone for several days, 
Darlene and Kevin became sincerely concerned for Santana's health and/or safety. As 
managers we also had some measure of responsibility to check on tenants when there were 
legitimate questions about their safety. After all the failed attempts to reach Santana by 
phone Darlene asked Kevin to go to Santana*s apartment and check on her. Santana's car 
was parked in it's usual place and had been there for several days. Neither Kevin or 
Darlene could remember seeing Santana outside her apartment for several days and had 
noted that the car had not been moved during that time either. Kevin went to Santana's 
door and rang the doorbell. After waiting several moments Kevin knocked on the door. 
After waiting several moments Kevin rang the doorbell again, and then knocked on the 
door again. There was no response from inside the apartment Kevin then used his pass 
key to unlock the bottom lock on the front door. At that moment Santana called out from 
inside the apartment saving "What's going on!" Kevin made no further attempts to unlock 
the door or enter the apartment. Santana unlocked the top lock and opened the door an 
inch or so to hear Kevin's explanation. Kevin told Santana that sinccncithcr Pat or 
» * 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The following are parties to the proceedings: 
1. Plaintiff/Countrclaim Defendant/Appellee Michael v. Shields; 
2. Defendant/Counterclaimant/Appellant Maria Cristina Santana; 
3. Counterclaim Defendant/Appellee Juanita Investments; 
4. Counterclaim Defendant/Appellee Parkside Apartments; 
5. Counterclaim Defendant Darlene Green, who is not an Appellee in this action 
because the claims brought by Appellant were settled; 
6. Counterclaim Defendant Kevin Green, who is not an Appellee in this action 
because the claims brought by Appellant were settled. 
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is an appeal from the District Court involving an unlawful detainer action 
and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-
2a-3(2)(j) as the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the Penalty Imposed on Appellee by Utah Code 
Annotated § 42-2-10 Remove Jurisdiction from the District Court 
from Hearing Appellee's Complaint? 
This issue involves questions of law. Conclusions of Law are reviewed for 
correctness. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991); Pendeleton v. 
Pendeleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah App. 1996); Smith v. Smith 793 P.2d 407, 409 
(Utah App. 1990) (hereafter "Standard of Review"). 
Preservation of issue: Appellant filed a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from 
Judgment arguing that the penalty imposed by § 42-2-10 required the trial court to set 
aside judgment in favor of Appellee because the statute barred Appellee from 
maintaining an action in any court of the state as a sanction for failure to comply with the 
registration requirements of the statute. (R. 1440-1457; 1463-1488.) 
2. Did Judge Fratto Err in Denying Appellant's Rule 60(b) 
Motion for Relief from Judgment Judgment Entered on Appellee's 
Complaint Based on Utah Code Annotated § 42-2-10? 
This issue involves questions of law subject to the standard of review stated with 
respect to the first issue, supra. 
Preservation of issue: Appellant filed a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from 
Judgment arguing that the penalty imposed by § 42-2-10 required the trial court to set 
aside judgment in favor of Appellee because the statute barred Appellee from 
1 
maintaining an action in any court of the state as a sanction for failure to comply with the 
registration requirements of the statute. (R. 1440-1457; 1463-1488.) 
3. Did Judge Fratto Err in Granting Summary Judgment on 
Nothing More than a Proposed Order where no Motion, Affidavits or 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts was filed as required under 
Rule 56? 
This issue involves questions of law subject to the standard of review stated with 
respect to the first issue, supra. 
Preservation of issue: Appellant filed an Answer to Appellee's Complaint for 
eviction raising numerous affirmative defenses relative to damages. (R. 6-33.) Judge 
Burton reserved all issues except the issue of unpaid rent for a later time. (R. 1278-
1285.) After the case was transferred to Judge Fratto, Appellee filed a proposed order on 
damages (R. 1203-1205) and Appellant filed an "Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed 
Judgment on Action for Unpaid Rent, Unlawful Detainer and Affidavits of John Mangum 
and Michael Shields" and "Affidavit Supporting Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs 
Proposed Judgment" setting forth specific material facts supporting Appellant's 
affirmative defenses and legal doctrines precluding entry of judgment in favor of 
Appellee. (R. 1206-1306.) 
4. Did Judge Fratto Err when he failed to require Appellee to 
Demonstrate Strict Adherence to the Unlawful Detainer Statute Prior 
to Awarding Damages and Attorneys Fees under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-36-1 et. seq.? 
This issue involves questions of law subject to the standard of review stated with 
respect to the first issue, supra. 
Preservation of issue: After Appellee filed a proposed order on damages without 
the benefit of an evidentiary hearing on damages, Appellant filed an "Objection to 
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Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment on Action for Unpaid Rent, Unlawful Detainer and 
Affidavits of John Mangum and Michael Shields" and "Affidavit Supporting Defendant's 
Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment" setting forth specific material facts 
supporting Appellant's arguments that Appellee did not strictly comply with the statute 
and affirmatively acted to deprive Appellant's rights under the statute. (R. 1206-1306.) 
5. Did Judge Fratto Err when he failed to apply the Doctrines of 
Equitable Estoppel and Procedural Unconscionability as to the issue of 
Damages and Attorneys Fees for Unlawful Detainer? 
This issue involves questions of law subject to the standard of review stated with 
respect to the first issue, supra. 
Preservation of issue: As stated above, Appellant filed an "Objection to 
Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment on Action for Unpaid Rent, Unlawful Detainer and 
Affidavits of John Mangum and Michael Shields" and "Affidavit Supporting Defendant's 
Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment" setting forth specific material facts 
supporting Appellant's arguments that Appellee did not strictly comply with the statute 
and that his actions attempting to deprive Appellant of her rights under the statute gave 
rise to the defense of equitable estoppel as to damages. (R. 1206-1306.) 
6. Did Judge Fratto Err when he Awarded Attorneys Fees 
Without Allocating Recoverable and Unrecoverable Fees? 
This issue involves questions of law subject to the standard of review stated with 
respect to the first issue, supra. 
Preservation of issue: As stated above, Appellant filed an "Objection to 
Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment on Action for Unpaid Rent, Unlawful Detainer and 
Affidavits of John Mangum and Michael Shields" and argued that the Court must allocate 
between recoverable and unrecoverable fees. (R. 1206-1306; 1317-1322; 1347-1358.) 
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7. Did Judge Joseph C. Fratto Err when he Awarded Attorneys 
Fees for Work Done by Counsel Behind the Scenes while Appellee was 
on the Record Pro Se? 
This issue involves questions of law subject to the standard of review stated with 
respect to the first issue, supra. 
Preservation of issue: As stated above, Appellant filed an "Objection to Plaintiffs 
Proposed Judgment on Action for Unpaid Rent, Unlawful Detainer and Affidavits of 
John Mangum and Michael Shields" and "Affidavit Supporting Defendant's Objection to 
Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment" and argued that the Court must not award attorneys fees 
for work done by counsel behind the scenes while Appellee was on the record as a pro se 
litigant. (R 1206-1306.) 
8. Was Judge Joseph C. Fratto's Award of Attorneys Fees Reasonable? 
This issue involves mixed questions of fact and law. Conclusions of Law are 
reviewed for correctness. Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991); 
Pendeleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah App. 1996); Smith v. Smith 793 P.2d 
407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). Findings of Fact are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous 
standard of review such that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Howell v. Howell supra. The Appellate Court 
defers to the trial court's factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous. 
Pendeleton v. Pendeleton, supra. The Appellant must demonstrate that they trial Court's 
Findings of Fact are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence thus making them clearly erroneous. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432 
(Utah App. 1994). 
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Preservation of issue: As stated above, Appellant filed an "Objection to 
Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment on Action for Unpaid Rent, Unlawful Detainer and 
Affidavits of John Mangum and Michael Shields" and requested a hearing on the issue of 
attorneys fees and argued to the Court that the amount requested was unreasonable. (R. 
1206-1306.) 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
A. The interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 42-2-5 and § 42-2-10 would 
be determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. The statute reads in 
pertinent part: 
§ 42-2-5. Certificate of assumed and of true name—Contents-
Execution—Filing—Notice 
(1) Every person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business in 
this state under an assumed name, whether that business is carried on, 
conducted, or transacted as an individual, association, partnership, 
corporation, or otherwise, shall file with the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code a certificate setting forth: 
(a) the name under which the business is, or is to be carried on, 
conducted, or transacted, and the full true name, or names, of the person 
owning, and the person carrying on, conducting, or transacting the 
business; and 
(b) the location of the principal place of business, and the street 
address of the person. 
(2) The certificate shall be executed by the person owning, and the 
person carrying on, conducting, or transacting the business, and shall be 
filed not later than 30 days after the time of commencing to carry on, 
conduct, or transact the business." 
§ 42-2-10. Penalties 
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business under 
an assumed name without having complied with the provisions of this 
chapter, and until the provisions of this chapter are complied with: 
(1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, 
counterclaim, cross complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts of 
this state..." (Utah Code Annotated § 42-2-5 and 42-210.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
S 
B. The interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 78-36-8.5(2)(a) would also 
be determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. That provision 
reads: 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures 
applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a possession bond under 
Subsection (1): 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon 
nonpayment of rent or utilities, the existing contract shall remain in force 
and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within three days of 
the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, utility 
charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as 
provided in the rental agreement. (Utah Code Annotated § 78-36-
8.5(2)(a).) (Emphasis added.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Court will notice that no transcript of the proceedings has been prepared. 
The reason for this is threefold: 1) Only one evidentiary hearing was held in this case, 
before Judge Michael K. Burton, after which he ordered restitution of the premises and 
reserved all issues on payment of rent, defenses and damages. That hearing and 
subsequent order are not at issue in this appeal so the transcript is unnecessary. 2) More 
than a year later, after the case was transferred to Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Judge Fratto 
entered summary judgment on the issue of damages that Judge Burton had reserved for a 
future time. Judge Fratto entered summary judgment without the benefit of a transcript 
of the hearing and without taking any additional evidence. As a consequence, Judge 
Fratto was in the dark as to the proceedings, the evidence, the defenses or issues that may 
or may not have been presented at said hearing, and it is therefore unnecessary at this 
stage to prepare a transcript of a hearing that he never considered. The absence of the 
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transcript emphasizes to this Court that Judge Fratto was a much in the dark about the 
hearing before Judge Burton as this Court must be without benefit of the transcript, and 
that Judge Fratto's entry of summary judgment was entirely lacking in evidentiary 
support. 3) Because no other evidentiary hearing was held in this case, there is no 
testimony or evidence for the Court to review. This Court need not review oral argument 
because the issues presented on appeal pivot upon the argument that Judge Fratto 
improperly failed to take evidence in the case and entered orders without evidentiary 
foundation. The pleadings and Judge Fratto's orders are self explanatory as the sum total 
of all evidence he considered in the case. 
The Court should also notice that Appellant has abandoned the counterclaim 
issues in this appeal. Therefore, the only remaining Appellee is Michael V. Shields who 
initiated the lawsuit as Plaintiff. 
A. Nature of the Case. The case involves an action for unlawful detainer 
and counterclaims related to tenancy in a residential apartment. 
B. Course of Proceedings: On August 24, 1997, Judge Michael K. Burton 
held an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony on the issue of unpaid rent. He entered 
an order of restitution of the premises based on unpaid rent, but expressly reserved all 
issues on damages for unpaid rent and the counterclaims to a future time. (R. 1278-
1285.) 
The case was subsequently transferred to Judge Joseph Fratto as a result of an 
angry ex parte communication on the part of Appellee and Judge Burton. (R 251) 
During the course of a year, Judge Fratto proceeded to dismiss the majority of 
counterclaims under Rule 12 and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R 657-
658; 1036-1037.) Judge Fratto heard no testimony on any issue and testimony taken 
before Judge Burton was not provided to, nor considered by, Judge Fratto as no transcript 
was available or entered into evidence. 
Once the final counterclaim was dismissed, Appellee filed a proposed order for 
summary judgment on the issue of damages for unpaid rent and unlawful detainer. (R. 
1203-1205.) No motion for summary judgment, no affidavits and no transcript of the 
hearing before Judge Burton indicating the issues that had been heard or the evidence 
presented was filed with Judge Fratto in connection with the proposed judgment for 
summary judgment. Appellee and his counsel simply filed affidavits stating the costs and 
fees incurred. The Court should note that a Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
last remaining counterclaim was filed by Appellee but said motion did not mention 
judgment on unpaid rent or unlawful detainer. It simply sought summary 
judgment on the remaining counterclaim. (R. 835-995.) No separate motion for 
summary judgment on unpaid rent and unlawful detainer was ever filed. Appellant 
immediately filed an objection and affidavit stating numerous grounds and defenses 
Judge Fratto must consider prior to entering summary judgment in favor of Appellee 
based on the proposed judgment and affidavit of fees and requesting a hearing on the 
issue of damages. (R. 1206-1306.) 
On September 11, 1998, Judge Fratto held a hearing for oral argument on the 
proposed order and Appellant's objection and granted summary judgment on the issue of 
damages despite no motion for summary judgment, no affidavits in support of summary 
judgment, no transcript of the evidentiary hearing before Judge Burton and no other 
evidence being before the Court. Judge Fratto held no evidentiary hearing and had no 
benefit of a transcript of the proceedings before Judge Burton other than a partial 
transcript wherein Judge Burton expressly reserved the issue of damages for a future time 
stating, "So it's a simple answer. The plaintiff can have the property back, a writ of 
restitution can issue, that all damages are reserved on each side and no other orders are 
going to issue except this stay on the quashing of the subpoena." (R. 1278-1285.) and 
which did not contain testimony or the substance of the issues presented at the hearing. 
(R. 1278-1285.) 
Judge Fratto simply accepted arguments by counsel for Appellee, having no 
transcript, having no affidavit of uncontested issues, and in the absence of Appellee who 
was not even present in the court. Appellant's objection had raised numerous issues of 
contested facts related to the issue of damages in affidavit, memorandum and as well as 
in oral argument. In contrast, Appellee failed to present a motion for summary judgment, 
affidavits in support thereof, or a mere statement of undisputed material facts that would 
support summary judgment. Appellee did not even claim in his pleadings that the issue 
of damages had been heard and decided by Judge Burton. Appellee did not respond to 
Appellant's factual disputes by affidavit or direct testimony. 
Judge Fratto granted summary judgment, nonetheless, based entirely on oral 
argument by Appellee's counsel without conducting an evidentiary hearing, reviewing 
the hearing transcript, or any affidavit submitted by Appellee and signed the order 
November 2, 1997. (R. 1410-1421.) Nothing in the record indicates that Judge Fratto 
had any knowledge of the content of testimony taken before Judge Burton, who did not 
take testimony on damages and had expressly reserved the issue, because no such 
transcript exists. Judge Fratto appears to have assumed that Judge Burton's hearing 
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covered all the issues relative to Appellee's complaint for eviction including damages and 
defenses to damages, although the order of restitution issued by Judge Burton is silent on 
the issue of damages and the partial transcript does not reveal whether he heard any issue 
other than whether service should be quashed and whether rent had been paid. 
Several days after entry of Judge Fratto's final judgment, Appellant discovered 
that Appellee, in his individual capacity, was not the owner of the property at the time of 
the lease nor at commencement of the action and that Parkside Apartments, the only 
leasor named on the lease, was not registered as an assumed name with the State of Utah, 
Division of Corporations are required under the law. Appellant filed a Rule 60(b) Motion 
for Relief from Judgment entered in favor of Appellee invoking the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated 42-2-10 which proscribe that a person doing business under an assumed 
name not in compliance with the registration requirements of the statute cannot bring an 
action in any court of the state. (R. 1440-1457.) Judge Fratto denied the motion. (R. 
1535.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Appellant moved into Parkside Apartments and began paying rent on July 
12, 1996. Seven weeks later on September 7, 1996, apartment manager Darlene Green 
presented Appellant with a lease agreement. (R 1206-1207; 1210-1211.) Manager 
Darlene Green signed on behalf of the "owner," and Appellant signed on behalf of 
herself. (R. 1226.) 
2. On July 28, 1997 Appellee filed a Complaint for Eviction and unpaid rent 
against Appellant as a pro se litigant based on a lease in which he was not a named party 
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on the theory that he is the owner of Parkside Apartments. (R. 1-5.) On September 5, 
1997, Appellee filed a Motion to Set Amount of Bond as a pro se litigant. (R. 61-65.) 
3. The lease which is the subject of the Complaint for eviction names the 
owner and contracting party as "Parkside Apartments," an entity which Appellant 
discovered after entry of final judgment is an assumed name not registered with the 
Division of Corporations. (R. 1440-1457.) Appellee's name does not appear and was not 
revealed on any document provided to Appellant as part of her tenancy. (R 1206-1207; 
1210-1211; 1226.) 
4. On August 8, 1997, Appellant served her Answer and Counterclaim upon 
Appellee and other counterclaim defendants. 
5. On August 12, 1997, Appellee acting pro se, executed and served upon 
Appellant two contradictory documents: (1) A Notice of Bond including a "Notice of 
Tenant's Rights" containing notice that Defendant had the right to chose to pay the rent 
and have the complaint dismissed and be reinstated in the lease (R. 61-62); and (2) A 
Notice of Non-Renewal stating that Appellant's lease would not be renewed and she must 
move in less than 30 days as provided for in the lease. (R. 1277.) 
6. On August 24, 1997, a hearing on the eviction was held, and counsel John 
Mangum made an appearance as counsel for Appellee who had acted pro se. No 
appearance of counsel had been filed prior to counsel's appearance in person at the 
hearing. 
7. Judge Michael K. Burton found that Appellee was entitled to restitution of 
the premises because rent had not been paid but declined to reach any issues as to 
damages, defenses or the counterclaims. (R. 1278-1285.) 
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8. On October 24, 1997, Judge Burton granted a continuance of a hearing 
due to Appellant's illness. The continuance provoked an angry exchange between 
Appellee and Judge Burton. 
9. On October 31, 1997, the parties appeared before Judge Burton and 
Appellant was informed by the judge of the ex parte communication. Judge Burton 
stated that the case was tainted because of the nature of the comments made by Appellee. 
10. Judge Burton recused himself and transferred the case to Judge Joseph C. 
Fratto. 
11. Judge Joseph C. Fratto proceeded over the course of more than a year to 
hear motions and argument on Appellant's counterclaims and eventually dismissed all 
counterclaims. (R. 657-658; 835-995.) Judge Fratto held no evidentiary hearings, took 
no evidence and was not privy to the testimony or evidence taken in the proceeding 
before Judge Burton. 
12. On September 21, 1998, Appellee filed a proposed judgment seeking 
summary judgment on treble damages, attorneys fees and costs. The proposed judgment 
was accompanied by affidavits of Appellee and his counsel setting forth the amount of 
costs and damages incurred. No motion for summary judgment, no memorandum, no 
affidavits in support thereof and no statement of undisputed material facts accompanied 
the proposed order. (R. 1203-1205.) 
13. On or about September 28, 1998, Appellant filed an "Objection to 
Proposed Judgment on Action for Unlawful Detainer and Affidavits of John Mangum and 
Michael Shields" alleging that the facts gave rise to several defenses including equitable 
estoppel and procedural unconscionability and that the issue of damages had been 
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reserved by Judge Burton until a future time and required an evidentiary hearing. (R 
1206-1306.) 
14. On November 2, 1998, Judge Fratto held a hearing and heard oral 
argument on the proposed order for summary judgment and Appellant's objection. Judge 
Fratto took no testimony and entered no findings that any facts were undisputed. Judge 
Fratto did not enter any findings of fact or conclusions of law as to Appellant's objections 
and defenses but simply granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. (R. 1410-
1421.) 
15. On or about November 9, 1998, Appellant filed a Rule 60(b) Motion for 
Relief from Judgment setting forth that Appellee was barred from maintaining an action 
in any court of the state under Utah Code Annotated § 42-2-10 because he conducted 
business under the assumed name Parkside Apartments without registering the name. 
Judge Fratto denied the Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment. (R. 1440-1457; 
1535.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Judgment on Appellee's Complaint must be set aside because the District Court 
had no jurisdiction to hear Appellee's complaint because Appellee is barred from 
maintaining an action in any court of the state while conducting business under an 
unregistered assumed name pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 42-2-10. Appellee 
brought his Complaint for eviction in his individual name on a lease naming Parkside 
Apartments as the leasor. Appellant filed a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment 
entered in favor of Appellee on his Complaint and invoked the penalty imposed by Utah 
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Code Annotated § 42-2-10. Appellee did not dispute that Parkside Apartments was not 
registered as an assumed name. 
The District Courts are granted jurisdiction by the Utah Constitution and by 
Statute. In the present controversy, jurisdiction over the claims of any person conducting 
business under an assumed name not registered with the Division of Corporations is 
removed from all courts in the state pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 42-2-10. 
II. 
The trial court was bound to set aside judgment in favor of Appellee on his 
Complaint because the judgment was void as a penalty provided by Utah Code Annotated 
§ 42-2-10 inasmuch as Appellee was prohibited from maintaining an action in any court 
of the state. 
III. 
The trial court committed error in granting summary judgment on the issue of 
damages for unlawful detainer and unpaid rent inasmuch as it completely ignored 
summary judgment standards and the requirements of Rule 56. No motion for summary 
judgment was filed, no affidavits in support of undisputed facts, no statement of 
undisputed facts and no testimony was introduced. Appellant opposed the proposed 
judgment and raised numerous issues of fact that gave rise to equitable defenses, which 
facts were not disputed by Appellee. The trial court did not view the facts in a light most 
favorable to Appellant as required under the law and blindly granted summary judgment 
based entirely on oral argument and a proposed order accompanied by affidavits 
regarding costs and fees—entirely ignoring Appellant's objections and factual disputes. 
IV. 
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Inasmuch as Appellant demonstrated that Appellee had served her a Notice of 
Tenant's Rights stating that she now had the right to pay the rent and be reinstated in the 
lease at the same time he served a Notice of Non-Renewal which cancelled out her right 
to reinstatement, and further alleged that Appellee had thereby intentionally deprived her 
of the right afforded her under the unlawful detainer statute, the trial court was bound to 
require Appellee to demonstrate strict adherence under the statute before awarding him 
the benefits of the statute and entering judgment in his favor. 
V. 
The evidence as demonstrated by the lease itself shows that Appellant moved into 
the apartment seven weeks before signing the rental lease. Appellant alleged by affidavit 
that she was not presented a lease until after moving into the apartment seven weeks later. 
No counter-affidavits or testimony was introduced by Appellee to dispute those facts. 
The trial court should have either taken testimony on the issue of procedural 
unconscionability or accepted Appellant's undisputed factual allegations. In the absence 
of a factual dispute, the trial court erred as a matter of law in not invoking the doctrine of 
procedural unconscionability as to the lease agreement presented seven weeks after 
moving into the apartment and in granting attorneys fees under the lease to Appellee. 
Further, as Appellant has previously stated, because Appellee served her a Notice 
of Tenant's Rights stating that she now had the right to pay the rent and be reinstated in 
the lease at the same time he served a Notice of Non-Renewal which cancelled out her 
right to reinstatement, and Appellant further alleged that Appellee had thereby 
intentionally deprived her of the right afforded her under the unlawful detainer statute, 
the trial court was bound to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel and deny Appellee 
the benefits of the statute while he deprived Appellant her rights under the statute. 
VI. 
The trial court arbitrarily awarded all attorneys fees and costs requested by 
Appellee without allocating between recoverable and unrecoverable fees despite 
Appellant's objection that the court must distinguish fees that are recoverable and from 
fees that are not recoverable based on the success and/or purpose of the work performed. 
The trial court committed error in not holding an evidentiary hearing on the attorneys 
fees, not making a distinction between fees incurred on successful motions and responses 
and fees incurred on unsuccessful ones. The trial court improperly awarded attorneys 
fees for matters where Appellee did not prevail and for attorneys fees during a time when 
Appellee was on the record as a pro se litigant. 
The trial courts award of attorneys fees in the amount of $31,465.29 on a 
complaint for $215 of unpaid rent is exorbitant and unreasonable where no bad faith was 
found on the part of Appellant and no findings of reasonableness of fees was made. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION OVER APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT AND 
JUDGMENT MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE JURISDICTION 
WAS REMOVED UNDER U.C.A. § 42-2-10 AS A SANCTION FOR 
CONDUCTING BUSINESS UNDER AN UNREGISTERED 
ASSUMED NAME. 
Subject matter jurisdiction goes to the question of the court's power to hear and 
decide the case. If a court does not have such power, it may not hear the case, even with 
the consent of the parties. Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243 (Utah 1993). The 
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jurisdictional competence of the trial court may be summarized as follows: "The district 
court shall have original subject matter jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this 
constitution or by statute..." Utah Const. Art. VIII, 5. "The district court has original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law." Utah Code Annotated 78-3-4(1) (Emphasis added.). 
For reasons that will be explained infra, the subject matter of Appellee's 
Complaint falls within the exception noted in U.C.A. 78-3-4(1), which grants the Court 
"original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law." (Emphasis added.). 
Appellant's challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is based on 
Appellee's violation of Utah Code Annotated 42-2-5(1 )(a)&(b), which reads: 
Every person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business in this 
state under an assumed name, whether that business is carried on, 
conducted or transacted as an individual association, partnership, 
corporation, or otherwise, shall filed with the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code a certificate setting forth: 
(a) the name under which the business is, or is to be carried on, 
conducted, or transacted, and the full true name, or names, of the person 
owning, and the person carrying on, conducting, or transacting the 
business; 
(b) the location of the principal place of business, and the street 
address of the person. (Emphasis added.) 
The penalty for not registering the name by filing the certificate is that the persons 
conducting business under the assumed name, not just the assumed name itself but the 
persons hiding behind the assumed name, cannot maintain any action arising from 
business conducted under the assumed name: 
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42-2-10. Penalties 
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business under 
an assumed name without having complied with the provisions of this 
chapter, and until the provisions of this chapter are complied with: 
(1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, 
counterclaim, cross complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts of this 
state... (Emphasis added.) 
Appellee's assumed name, Parkside Apartments appears as the only owner on the 
lease. (R. 1-5) Appellee's Complaint against Appellant apparently relies solely on the 
claim that it is the real party in interest behind the lessor whose name appears on the lease 
as "Parkside Apartments."—although Appellee has failed to allege that the lessor named 
on the lease is its assumed name. 
Parkside Apartments was not registered with the Division of Corporations on 
November 2, 1998 when Appellee was granted summary judgment on his complaint for 
eviction and damages. (R. 1440-1457.) This fact has never been disputed by Appellee. 
Certification of the assumed name is a precondition for Appellee to bring suit on the lease 
that names Parkside Apartments as the "lessor" or the contracting party in interest. If 
Appellant acquired standing to sue on a lease that does not name him, it must stem from 
the fact that the named lessor is merely Appellee's assumed name—which the Court has 
apparently accepted by entering judgment in his favor. By conducting business as 
Parkside Apartments, without filing the certificate with the State's Division of 
Corporations, Appellee committed a clear violation of the statute. 
The issue before this Court is whether subject matter jurisdiction existed for the 
district court to hear and/or enter judgment on Appellee's Complaint despite his violation 
of Utah Code Annotated 42-2-5 and the accompanying penalty provided in Utah Code 
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Annotated 42-2-10. Appellant maintains that no subject matter jurisdiction exists 
precisely because it is "prohibited by law" as a "penalty." (Utah Code Annotated 78-3-
4(1) (district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted 
in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.") (Emphasis added.)) 
Ordinarily, statutes that give rise to causes of action expressly grant jurisdiction to 
particular courts. This statute, however, instead of granting jurisdiction, expressly 
removes jurisdiction from "any of the courts of this state." Utah Code Annotated 42-2-
10(1). The statute deals directly with the courts as much as it does the person in non-
compliance. 
Moreover, the language in Blodgett v. Zion's First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901 
(Utah App. 1988), the controlling case on this issue, which states that "access to the 
courts [is denied]" reasonably implies that the court, which only has jurisdiction 
expressly granted, is without jurisdiction to hear the subject matter of any claim made by 
one whose access has been barred as a sanction and penalty: 
We acknowledge that Utah Code Annotated Section 42-2-10 (1981) 
mandates that any persons who conduct business under an assumed name 
cannot sue, prosecute, or maintain any action in any of the courts unless 
they comply with the name registration statutes...[T]he only sanction for 
this non-compliance with the assumed name is denying [plaintiff] access 
to the courts. (Emphasis added.) 
Blodgett at 905. See Wall Inv. Co. v. Garden State Distributing 593 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 
1979). 
The statute plainly refers to this inaccessibility to the courts as a "penalty." The 
Court of Appeals views the penalty as a "sanction." More importantly, the plain 
language of the statute bars the Court itself from hearing any action brought by a person 
in violation of the statute, thereby removing jurisdiction over this particular action which 
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is "prohibited by law." See Utah Code Annotated 78-3-4(1) (Emphasis added.) If the 
sanction and penalty is that access to the courts is denied, it logically follows that the 
court cannot remove the penalty and grant access that is prohibited by law. As such, 
jurisdiction has been removed from the district court over claims arising from an 
unregistered assumed name. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE VACATED JUDGMENT ON 
APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT BECAUSE IT IS LEGALLY VOID 
PURSUANT TO U.C.A. § 42-2-10. 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to determine a 
controversy and without which it cannot proceed. Without jurisdiction over the subject 
matter alleged in plaintiffs claims, the court was without authority to proceed or enter 
any adjudication on the merits of the claims." Transworld Systems Inc. v. Robinson, 796 
P.2d 409 (Utah App. 1990). If Appellee's claims were barred as a "penalty" and 
"sanction," the Court had no authority over his claims and any judgment is void. 
Appellee's Complaint for eviction was brought and maintained entirely on the 
basis that Appellant allegedly breached the lease agreement entered with the assumed 
name Parkside Apartments. (R. 1-5.) The entity known as Parkside Apartments and the 
person conducting business under the assumed name "Parkside Apartments" cannot 
maintain an action in any court in the state. Therefore, while the Court has general 
jurisdiction over the type of action brought by Appellee, the Court does not have 
authority or jurisdiction over the subject matter in this particular action because Appellee 
is barred from bringing the action, and jurisdiction over this specific action is removed 
from the courts of the state by statute. 
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"Judgment is void when entered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
over the controversy, and must be set aside.'" Van Der Stappen v. Van Der Stappen, 815 
P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah App. 1991); Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 
1987). The Van Der Stappen case provides guidance on the issue of when a judgment is 
considered void. The case involved a motion to set a side a divorce decree on grounds 
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the marriage was void pursuant 
to statute in that one of the parties was still married to her first husband when she 
subsequently married the appellant. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's 
denial of the Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment and found that since the 
marriage was void, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it entered the 
divorce decree and it too was void and must be set aside. The lower court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over divorces but not that specific divorce because the marriage itself 
was precluded by statute. 
In the present case, the trial court has jurisdiction over evictions but not this 
eviction because Appellant is precluded by statute from maintaining this action. The 
judgment entered against Appellee is void because the lease is unenforceable by Appellee 
against Appellant under Utah Code Annotated 42-2-10(1) which precludes Appellee from 
enforcing any rights arising from business conducted under the assumed name in any 
court of the state. Inasmuch as Appellee's right to sue under the lease was barred as a 
sanction, there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the lease or controversy and the 
judgment is therefore void. "Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court 
by consent or waiver, and a judgment can be attacked for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction as any time."" Van Der Stappen at 1337. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON NOTHING MORE THAN A 
PROPOSED ORDER WHERE NO MOTION, AFFIDAVITS, OR 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS OR TESTIMONY WERE 
PRESENTED. 
Summary Judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
which states: 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim 
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after 
the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after 
service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof... 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda 
and affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount 
of damages. 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration states in pertinent part: 
(2) Motions for Summary Judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in Support of a Motion. The points and 
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a Motion. The points and 
authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin 
with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to 
which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall 
be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to 
those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if 
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applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's 
facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record 
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
Despite these longstanding rules of procedure, the trial court granted summary 
judgment on Appellee's complaint based on a proposed order that was simply filed 
together with affidavits setting forth the amount costs and fees incurred, but not setting 
forth any undisputed facts upon which summary judgment must be entered as a matter of 
law. (R. 1143-1179;1194-1199;1203-1205.) No motion for summary judgment was filed 
and no evidence was introduced to indicate that all the issues had been resolved in favor 
of Appellee at the hearing before Judge Burton more than a year earlier. As previously 
explained supra, Judge Fratto was completely in the dark as to the issues reached and 
testimony rendered at the hearing before Judge Burton. No transcript exists of the 
testimony or the hearing, except for a five page excerpt provided by Appellee which 
clearly indicates that Judge Burton reserved all issues other than the issue of restitution of 
premises for a future time. Nothing in the record indicates that said hearing fully reached 
all the issues related to Appellee's complaint or Appellant's answer and defenses. On the 
contrary, the record indicates clearly that Judge Burton stated, 
"Does Ms. Santana get to stay in the place or leave? The issues of 
damages clearly, either on the counterclaim or on any claim by the 
plaintiff here, ought to be reserved until a later date. But I am going to 
order at this juncture that a write of restitution be issued on behalf of the 
plaintiff....So it's a simple answer. The plaintiff can have the property 
back, a writ of restitution can issue, that all damages are reserved on each 
side and no other orders are going to issue except this stay on the quashing 
of the subpoena." (R. 1278-1285.) 
Clearly Judge Fratto had no additional evidence as to the facts, defenses or 
testimony presented at the hearing before Judge Burton and could not have based his 
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entry of summary judgment on said hearing. Judge Fratto blindly granted summary 
judgment simply because Appellee stealthily filed a proposed order for damages on 
unpaid rent and unlawful detainer before any of the issues pertaining to damages could be 
properly adjudicated. 
"A trial court may properly grant summary judgment or directed verdict only 
when reasonable minds could not differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence 
presented." Olympus Hill Shopping Center, LTd v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 
889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah App. 1994); Heslop v. Bank of Utah 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 
1992); West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah App. 1993). "The 
trial court must access those facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motions and must conclude, as a matter of law, that they do not support the claim 
presented." Olympus Hill citing Heslop, 839 P.2d at 838. 
Appellant filed an affidavit and Objection to the proposed order requesting a 
hearing and setting forth disputed facts that supported her defenses as set forth in her 
Answer to Appellee's complaint. (R. 6-33.) Nothing in the court record indicates that 
Appellant's defenses to contract and damages were intended by Judge Burton to be 
heard at the summary proceeding held on August 24, 1997 which only determined 
whether rent had been paid and a writ of restitution should issue. (R. 1278-1285.) 
Nothing in the record indicates a waiver of said defenses or that an opportunity to have 
the defenses heard was afforded. 
IV. 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PRECLUDED APPELLEE FROM 
RECOVERING TREBLE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
BECAUSE HE GAVE NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY 
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APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO REINSTATEMENT UNDER U.C.A. § 
78-36-8.5(2)(a). 
Appellee filed a Complaint and sought to benefit from Utah Code Annotated § 
78-36-1 et seq. In actions for unlawful detainer, however, "statutes provide severe 
remedy and must be strictly complied with before cause of action thereon may be 
maintained." Nan Zyverden v. Farrar, 393 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1964). 
Appellant demonstrated that Appellee had served her a Notice of Tenant's Rights 
stating that she now had the right to pay the rent and be reinstated in the lease at the same 
time he served a Notice of Non-Renewal which cancelled out her right to reinstatement, 
and further alleged that Appellee had thereby intentionally deprived her of the right 
afforded her under the unlawful detainer statute. (R 1277. See Addendum page 1277.) 
Appellee did not dispute those facts. Therefore, the trial court was bound to require 
Appellee to demonstrate strict adherence under the statute before awarding him the 
benefits of the statute and entering judgment in his favor on November 2, 1998. (R.1410-
1421.) 
Judge Burton declined to reach the issue of damages and simply found at the 
August 24, 1997 hearing that possession rightly belonged to Appellee because Appellant 
had not pad the rent due. (R 1278-1285) While Plaintiff was entitled to possession, he 
was not entitled to treble damages or attorneys fees under the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel because he did not comply with the provisions of the statute, and acted to 
prevent Appellant from being reinstated in the lease as required under Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-36-8.5 (2)(a). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures 
applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a possession bond under 
Subsection (1): 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon 
nonpayment of rent or utilities, the existing contract shall remain in force 
and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within three days of 
the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, utility 
charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as 
provided in the rental agreement. (Emphasis added.) 
On August 12, 1997, Appellee executed the Notice of Bond together with the 
Notice of Rights of Tenants which notified Appellant she had the right to pay the accrued 
rent and be reinstated in the lease. By no coincidence on that same day, in what appeared 
a deliberate attempt to preempt the three days to pay and be reinstated. Appellee served a 
Notice of Non-Renewal stating that Appellant's lease would not be renewed and she must 
move within 18 days. (R 1277. See Addendum page 1277.)....) Appellant's lease did 
not allow for termination upon 18 days notice but required 30 days notice. "If the 
tenancy reverts to a month to month tenancy, written notice of termination must be given 
by either party at least 30 days before the end of the month." (R. 1-5.) Appellant 
reasonably interpreted the Notice of Non-Renewal served on the same day as a device by 
Appellee to circumvent Appellant's right to elect reinstatement. In a case analogous to 
this one, Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Co., the Court held, "The landlord cannot 
prevent the tenant from paying the judgment and regaining his rights under the unexpired 
lease by the device of failing to have the amount of rent due included in the judgment." 
504 P.2d 40, 42 (Utah 1972). At the time Appellee served the Notice of Tenant's Rights, 
the amount owed was minimal as Plaintiff was acting pro se and the unpaid rent 
amounted to less than one month. (R 1-5.) 
"[Equitable estoppel requires] requires three essential core 
elements: 1) a party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act that is 
inconsistent with a later asserted claim; 2) reasonable action or inaction by 
a second party, taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, 
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act, or failure to act; 3) injury to the second party resulting from allowing 
the first party to repudiate it's statement, admission, act, or failure to act." 
Mendez v. State of Utah, 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991); Ceco 
Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989). 
Appellant was sufficiently clear on Appellee's intent not to allow her to stay no 
matter what she did. Appellant reasonably relied upon Appellee's representations and 
elected the alternative remedy of requesting a hearing rather than risk that payment of 
rent would nonetheless result in another action for eviction pursuant to the Notice of 
Non-Renewal. The trial court should not have allowed Appellee to repudiate his actions 
in blocking Appellant's right to pay and be reinstated. Appellant suffered injury because 
the trial court allowed Appellee to repudiate his actions and recover treble damages and 
attorneys fees under the statute when he made clear his intent to obtain the statute's 
benefits but block Appellant's rights under the same statute. 
"Equitable estoppel... is a doctrine of Equity to prevent on party from deluding or 
inducing another into a position where he will unjustly suffer loss." J.P. Koch, Inc., v. 
J.C Penny Co., Inc., (Utah 1975). A trial court's finding that equitable estoppel is 
inapplicable is reviewed for correctness. Holland v. Career Services, 856 P.2d 678, 682 
(Utah App. 1993). The trial court had a duty to consider Appellant's claims for equitable 
estoppel and entirely failed to enter any findings or conclusions as to the inapplicability 
of the doctrine despite Appellee's failure to dispute the facts. 
V. 
THE FACTS SUGGEST PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY 
AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO VIEW THE FACTS IN A 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO APPELLANT. 
The evidence as demonstrated by the lease itself shows that Appellant moved into 
the apartment seven weeks before signing the rental lease. (R. 1206-1207; 1210-1211; 
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1226.) Appellant alleged by affidavit that she was not presented a lease until after 
moving into the apartment seven weeks later. (R. 1206-1207; 1210-1211.) No counter-
affidavits or testimony was introduced by Appellee to dispute those facts. 
Before entering summary judgment and ignoring Appellant's objections and 
factual allegations supporting procedural unconscionability, the trial court should have 
either taken testimony on the issue or accepted Appellant's undisputed factual allegations 
as precluding summary judgment. The lease was an adhesion contract because it was 
"prepared in a standardized form and presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to one 
occupying a disadvantaged bargaining position." System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 
P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). Courts have long refused to enforce contract terms arising from 
this sort of procedural unconscionability. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 
706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985); Williams v. Walker- Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 
449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
Inasmuch as the lease was presented seven weeks after moving into the 
apartment, the trial court erred in not viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
Appellant on the issue and in blindly granting attorneys fees under the lease to Appellee. 
Heslop, 839 P.2d at 838. 
VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED NO FACTUAL FINDINGS ON 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND DID NOT 
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN RECOVERABLE AND NON 
RECOVERABLE FEES. 
"An award of attorney fees must be based on the evidence and supported by 
findings of fact." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992). One 
who seeks an award of attorney fees, therefore, has the burden of producing evidence to 
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buttress the requested award. See Cottonwood at 268; Hal Taylor Assoc, v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750-51 (Utah 1982). When the evidence presented is 
insufficient, an award of attorney fees cannot stand. See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 
989. In this regard, we have mandated that a party seeking fees must allocate its fee 
request according to its underlying claims. See Cottonwood Mall, 830 P.2d at 269-70. 
Indeed, the party must categorize the time and fees expended for "(1) successful claims 
for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which 
there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful, and 
(3) claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees." Id. at 269-70; see also 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998) (petition for rehearing pending). 
Claims must also be categorized according to the various opposing parties. See Turtle 
Management, 645 P.2d at 671. Foote v. Clark 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). 
VII. 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES WAS EXORBITANT AND 
UNREASONABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF BAD FAITH ON THE 
PART OF APPELLANT. 
Appellee filed his Complaint for eviction claiming $215 in unpaid rent. The trial 
court awarded $ 31,465.29 in attorneys fees or 146 times the amount of damages 
requested. No factual findings of bad faith or even reasonableness were made by the trial 
court to justify such an exorbitant award of attorneys fees. "Whether attorney fees are 
recoverable is a question of law." See Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252, 
1257 (Utah Ct.App.1996). By reason of Appellant's objections and defenses of equitable 
estoppel and procedural unconscionability, the trial court should not have awarded 
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attorneys fees in the absence of evidence from Appellee disputing the facts that gave rise 
to said defenses. 
The trial court failed to properly categorize the fee request or detail the factors it 
considered in computing the award. "Whether the trial court's findings of fact in 
awarding attorney fees are sufficient is a question of law which we review for 
correctness." Endrody v. Endrody 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct.App.1996). This is not 
a case where the trial court awarded $31,465.29 in attorneys fees and explained how it 
arrived at this amount. The trial court simply signed Appellee's proposed order vaguely 
stating, 
"Plaintiff as the prevailing party both in prosecuting the claims of the 
Complaint and in defending against the affirmative defenses and 
counterclaims and other discovery and procedural filings of Defendant in 
this action, is further awarded judgment against Defendant for attorney 
fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff to his attorneys at Nielson & Senior for 
legal work actually performed by Nielson & Senior through November 2, 
1998 in the sum of $31, 465. 29 which work was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute this action to judgment and was billed at rates 
consistent with rates customarily charged in this community for similar 
services, all of which fees and costs are authorized pursuant to the 
provisions of Sections 10 of the Uniform Residential Rental Agreement 
promulgated and approved by the Apartment Association of Utah which 
was signed and otherwise accepted and agreed to by Defendant and 
pursuant to section 78-36-10(3) of the Utah Code." (R. 1410-1421.) 
More importantly, the trial court entered no Findings of Fact and therefore the 
judgment is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence thus 
making it clearly erroneous. The trial court altogether failed to ascertain facts upon 
which Appellee was entitled to attorneys fees because it did not review the testimony of 
the hearing before Judge Burton on the order of restitution (as no transcript existed) and 
did not hold an evidentiary hearing on Appellant's defenses, objections and factual 
allegations contained in the Answer to Appellee's complaint. Judge Fratto simply 
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assumed that Judge Burton had considered all the issues and assumed that damages on 
the unlawful detainer were a matter of course and that Appellee's filing of a proposed 
judgment was proper without any evidence or factual support for summary judgment on 
the issue of damages or on the issue of Appellant's affirmative defenses as contained in 
her Answer and Objection to Proposed Order. (R. 6-33; 1206-1306.) 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence before the court clearly establishes that the legal conclusions made 
by the trial court are incorrect and unsupported by adequate factual findings and were so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence making them clearly 
erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment dated November 2,1998 should be reversed. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: I think my initial reaction is: We are a 
liberal, I guess, notice pleading state but there is this 
issue of notice that ought to be followed. 
MR. MANGUM: We understand. 
THE COURT: And I think on the issue of this 
restraining order and the quashing of the subpoenas, 
Mr. Orifici makes a point, and I think I can't ignore it, that 
they're not properly before me right now. 
I think it is fair at this juncture, if the informa-
tion has not been divulged by these institutions, to grant an 
order staying the implementation of the subpoenas until at 
least September 20. And I just pick that day, it gives every-
body a chance to come in and talk about it if they want. So I 
will order that, an order staying. 
But on the issue of the ultimate quashing of the 
subpoena or the restraining against Ms. Santana for acts that 
some people think she may or may not have committed or will 
commit, I don't think it's before me at this juncture. So 
that's my ruling on that one. You can have an order that 
allows you until September 20 but after that, if nothing's 
been done, no resolution reached, they'll go ahead. 
All right. To me then—I've answered some questions 
and the question it really comes down to is: Does Ms. Santana 
get to stay in the place or leave? The issues of damages 
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clearly, either on the counterclaim or on any claim by the 
plaintiff here, ought to be reserved until a later date. But 
I am going to order at this juncture that a writ of 
restitution be issued on behalf of the plaintiff. And the 
reason I do this is as follows. 
Number one, I have no evidence that any rent beyond 
the $300 was ever tendered and so there's clearly no failure 
to accept that tender of rent. So I find as a matter of fact 
that she was $215 behind in her July rent. I've already found 
that she was properly served a three-day notice to pay or 
quit. It's clear that she continues to possess the property 
and she is in unlawful detainer and the plaintiff has supplied 
the bond. She ought to be—and on that issue of possession, 
it ought to go to the plaintiff. 
I don't know if I need to be more specific, but on 
this issue of habitability it's clear to me that no evidence 
has been presented to me along the lines of what Utah 
recognizes as a covenant of habitability that anything has 
ever been done as regards Ms. Santana and her occupancy there 
to say that these folks violated the covenant of habitability. 
And I don't know if there are other issues that I 
need to answer, but I'd like to do that if there are any that 
you think, Mr. Mangum, ought to be answered today. 
So it's just a simple answer. The plaintiff can have 
the property back, a writ of restitution can issue, that all 
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damages are reserved on each side and no other orders are 
going to issue except this stay on the quashing of the 
subpoena. 
MR. MANGUM: Understood, Your Honor. I do have a— 
THE COURT: Do you have any other issues that— 
MR. MANGUM: —form of order for writ of rest— 
THE COURT: Do you have any other issues that you 
think I need to answer? 
MR. MANGUM: Not at this point. 
THE COURT: Mr. Orifici, is there something I missed 
on your end— 
MR. ORIFICI: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: —that I need to answer right now? All 
right. So, you've got something to sign? 
MR. MANGUM: An order of restitution of the premises. 
THE COURT: If I may get a look at it. 
MR. MANGUM: If I could just verify, Your Honor. I 
did have to make an interlineation on Point 1. I had the 
wrong unit number specified there. And does your copy read 
Unit 36 or Unit 21? 
THE COURT: It does not. 
MR. MANGUM: It should say 36, not Unit 21. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MANGUM: That's my mistake and I apologize. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, do you plan to serve 
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her today? 
MR. SHIELDS: Please. 
MR. MANGUM: We would like her to be served here in 
open court. 
THE COURT: okay. So, I mean, this issue of when I'm 
going to order her out, she has three days from today. 
MR. SHIELDS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: So I guess we should make it conform. 
Restore possession thereafter to the plaintiff on the—let's 
see. Well, Ms. Santana, they're going to serve you today on 
this order of restitution. 
MS. SANTANA: That's fine. I accept. 
THE COURT: And we're at 5:30 and today's the 25th, 
so—let's see, you get 26, 27 and 28, so by the 29th day of 
August at 5:30 p.m. That, by my calculation, is three days 
from today, not counting today's date as the date of service— 
it being the day of service. 
And then, Ms. Santana, you folks have the right to 
appeal, obviously, and the right to contest the order if it's 
done within three days of the order and, of course, the right 
to appeal pursuant to the statute. 
MR. MANGUM: Your Honor, a point of clarification. 
Three business days, if we understand it, from today, being 
the 25th, would be the 28th. Have we miscounted? 
THE COURT: Well, I've got it the 26th, 27th and 
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28th, three to leave. Oh, yeah, okay. The 28th. 
MR. MANGUM: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. So it's the 28th. All right. 
Do you have a copy of this for them? 
MR. MANGUM: I do. And if I could get that 
conformed. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Orifici? Any 
questions you might have? 
MR. ORIFICI: None that I can think of, Your Honor. 
The only thing I would like to do is just request a tape 
transcript. 
THE COURT: Carolyn, how is that done? Now on the 
transcript, we give you the tape and then you—we make a copy 
of the tape and then you just work out the transcription part. 
(Discussion about obtaining tape.) 
MR. ORIFICI: We appreciate your time and considera-
tion, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: No problem. Thank you both. 
MR. MANGUM: Thank you, Your Honor, for your 
attention to this matter. 
THE COURT: Everything else is reserved for and at a 
later date. 
(This ends the requested portion of this hearing.) 
* * * 
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